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THE ESTABLISHMENT SYNDROME
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
John E. Dunsford*
Seventeen years have passed since the Supreme Court chose the
establishment clause of the First Amendment as the preferred reed
through which to breathe modern relevance into an 18th century
formulation of church-state relationships.' Prior to 1947 the Court
"had seldom undertaken to supply content to that part of the first
amendment concerned with separation."' 2 With the Everson decision, 3 a period opened in which the commodious dimensions of the
establishment concept invited the legal soul to trace out that grand
design which presumably must distinguish and exalt the American
understanding of the place of religion in society. Almost to a man,
the Justices who have served the Court during these years have
taken the occasion to set forth at length and with passion their convictions on this sensitive subject. 4 Besides yielding a rich harvest
* B.S. St. Louis University; LL.B., St. Louis University; LL.M. Harvard
University; Associate Professor of Law, St. Louis University.
1. U.S. CONST. Amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " While the two
portions of the Amendment are participial phrases, they will be called clauses in
conformance with judicial usage and popular expression.
2. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw 80 (1962).
3. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Prior cases dealing
with the establishment clause are Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940);
Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930); Selective Draft
Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
4. One has only to consider the number of Justices for whom a "position"
may be erected based upon their opinions in this field: Rutledge, Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Brennan, Jackson, Stewart, Harlan.
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for editors of Collected Papers, and feeding the rushing streams of
judicial biography, the mass of words has excited an exquisite, and
perhaps inevitable, confusion.
One commentator has subtitled his magnus opus treatment of the
cases "authorities in search of a doctrine. ' 5 His description of the
judicial efforts after all this time is less than a ringing endorsement:
The encouraging fact is that the Court is at last searching
for an appropriate rationale for the religion clauses. One
should not ask that it run before it walks. 6
Another observer, whose sympathies for the difficult role which the
Court performs cannot be doubted, has publicly confessed that the
train of cases is a "juristic enigma. ' 7 A member on the Court itself
has recently characterized some of the legal doctrine as built on
"resounding but fallacious fundamentalist rhetoric . . . "8 With due
respect for the Court as an institution, and conscious of the dreary
fact that much of the criticism is "ill-considered, petulant, or supercilious," 9 one may still conclude that the performance in the churchstate area has been disappointingly eclectic and unsatisfying.
The sixteen words of the First Amendment which form the religion
clauses dividely grammatically into two prohibitions on congressional
powers. One bars Congress from making any law "respecting an
establishment of religion"; the other bars Congress from making any
law "prohibiting the free exercise of religion." The first source of
doctrinal difficulty for the Court has been its inability, despite innumerable efforts, to lay down a principled statement of the scope of
the establishment clause. Another part of the exegetical complexity
of the Amendment stems from the difficulty in reconciling its two
parts in a unitary theory of church-state. That these two aspects
of the problem are closely entwined is suggested by the consideration
that both history and analysis support the single-purpose function of
5.

KURLAND, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 19.

6.

KURLAND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASES IN THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH

AND STATE 179 (Oaks ed. 1963). An ironic note in the ritual insistence that people
read Supreme Court opinions before they criticize them Is the admission that
the opinions frequently do not help to explain the result. "The opinions do reveal
a groping for doctrine that should be applied, but it cannot be said that the
search has been crowned with success." Id. at 158.
7. Cahn, The "Establishment of Religion" Puzzle, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
1274, 1277 (1961). "Perhaps, In establishment contests, the Court has become
something like a jury, with jury's measure of predictability."
8. Justice Stewart concurring in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 416
(1963).
9. Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 25
(1962).
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the Amendment: the preservation of religious liberty. At a minimum
it may be assumed that each part of the Amendment must serve that
ultimate end with due regard for the thrust of the other part.
In the last term of Court, two major issues relating to the presence
of religion in public life were brought before the Court under the
two clauses of the Amendment. In a case testing the constitutionality
of bible-reading in public schools, the Court found an establishment
of religion.10 In a case challenging the exclusion of a Sabbatarian
from unemployment compensation benefits where his religious convictions impeded his availability for work, the Court found a violation of free exercise rights.' 1 Paradoxically one state was found to
breach the Amendment because it failed to take cognizance of religious differences of its citizens, while two other states were judged
in violation because they did consider the factor of religion.
The plan of this article is to explore the bases for these two decisions as a prelude to an investigation of the interrelationship of the
non-establishment and free exercise clauses. Part of that investigation will entail an analysis of the several approaches which the
Supreme Court has used in defining the establishment concept. A
final section presents an alternative perspective from which the
meaning of the Amendment may be viewed.

THE BIBLE-READING CASES
Murray
One of two cases before the Court on Bible reading in the public
schools came up on the pleadings when the Maryland Court of Appeals approved the trial court's sustaining of a demurrer by the de2
fendant board.'
Since 1905, the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City
had prescribed through rule that shool open each day with "the reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use
of the Lord's Prayer. The Douay version may be used by those pupils who prefer it."' 3 "Patriotic exercises" were also required as part
of the opening exercises. In 1960, the rule was amended to provide:
"Any child shall be excused from participating in the opening exercises or from attending the opening exercises upon written request of
14
his parent or guardian."'
10.
11.
12.
13.
adopted
14.

School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1936).
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698 (1962).
Art. VI, sec. 6, Rules of Board of School Commissioners. The rule was
pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE, art. 77, sec. 202.
Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 240, 179 A.2d 698, 699 (1962).
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Through a writ of mandamus, the petitioners-a 14-year old
student and his mother sought to compel the Board to rescind the rule,
alleging violations of the religion clauses of the First Amendment
and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth.
According to the petition, the practice under the rule has been to
read from the King James version of the Bible, and until the adoption of the amendment, the pupil had been required to attend the
program and recite the Lord's prayer. After the change in 1960, the
plaintiff-minor was excused at the request of his mother. Claiming
that the enforcement of the amended rule threatened their religious
liberty as atheists, the plaintiffs asserted a subjection of their "freedom of conscience to the rule of the majority," and objected to the
rule's equation of moral and spiritual values with those of religion,
thereby rendering "sinister, alien and suspect the beliefs and ideals
of your petitioners, promoting doubt and question of their morality,
good citizenship and good faith."15 In specific reference to the amendment requiring child excusal at parental request, the complaint
charged that the exercise of such exemption caused the child "to lose
caste with his fellows, to be regarded with aversion, and to be subjected to reproach and insult."' 6
An interesting aspect of the state court opinion rejecting the
petitioners' claims, over the dissent of three judges, is the almost
palpable effort to intuit a result in the absence of any clear guidance
in precedent. The majority thus locates the First Amendment issue
as falling "somewhere between the decision in McCollum and that in
Zorach,"'7 the two cases bracketing the zone of legal significance in
the released time programs of religious instruction. After characterizing the McCollum result as based on a prohibited utilization of the
school system to aid religious groups in the spread of their faith
through instruction classes, the Maryland court emphasized the lack
of compulsion to participate in the Bible reading exercise.' 8 On the
claimed denial of equal protection, the Court answered that "the
equality of treatment which the Fourteenth Amendment affords cannot and does not provide protection from the embarrasment, the
15.

Id. at 699-704.
16. Id. at 705.
17. Id. at 702. The decision was rendered prior to Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962).
18. The school program under attack was placed in the same category
"as the opening prayer ceremonies in the Legislature of this State and in the
Congress of the United States, in the public meeting and conventions which are
opened with prayers or supplications to God, and in the formal call of court
sessions by the crier in State and Federal courts." Id. at 702.
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divisiveness or the psychological discontent arising out of nonconformance with the mores of the majority."' 1 9
Interpreting the same Supreme Court authorities as had the majority, the dissenting opinion reached a different result. The challenged program was plainly a Christian religious exercise, and therefore deemed a favoring of one religion against others, and against
non-believers in any religion. In light of the Supreme Court's insistence that the establishment clause be given a broad interpretation,
the minority concluded that the McCollum decision controlled, and
the state was engaging in an improper aiding of religion. This conclusion was reinforced by what the minority thought constituted the
dual coercive effect of the program. As far as the establishment of
religion was concerned, the coercive element was the requirement
that the child affirmatively seek an exemption from participation
when his attendance at school was compelled by law. In regard to the
free exercise problem, the objectionable feature was the burden
placed on a person who wanted an exemption to profess a disbelief in
religion. The minority feared that the individual might be thus pressured into subordinating his convictions on religion to the desire to
remain popular with the group.
Schempp
In contrast to the pleader's allegations of the Murray case, and its
barren record, the second case before the Supreme Court offered details of the Pennsylvania program developed at trial and in a second
hearing consequent upon an amendment of the state statute. In this
instance, a three-judge statutory District Court had held a Biblereading program in violation of the establishment clause. 2 0
The original action in the Schempp case challenged a Pennsylvania
statute which provided for the reading of "at least ten verses from
the Holy Bible" without comment at the opening of each school
day. 2 1 No reference was made to any exemptions from the reading
and teachers who failed or omitted to perform the task were to be
discharged "upon charges preferred for such failure or omission, and
proof of the same."' 2 2 Outside of the statutory mandate, the practice
of reciting the Lord's prayer after the Bible reading had been followed for some 30 years. Following a decision that the statute and
practice violated both the establishment and free exercises clauses
19.
20.

Id. at 704.
Schempp v. School Dist., 201 F.Supp. 815 (E.D. Penn. 1962).

21.
22.

Schempp v. School Dist., 177 F.Supp. 398 (E.D. Penn. 1959).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, sec. 15-1516 (1962).
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of the First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 2 3 the statute was amended. 2 4 In its revised form,
the statute permitted a child to be excused from the reading, or
attendance at it, "upon the written request of his parent or guardian." 2 5 The provision relating to discharge of a defaulting teacher
was dropped, though, as the special District Court noted, the existing
statutory grounds for terminating a teacher's employment contract
26
included "persistent and wilful violation of the school laws."
According to the evidence, children in the senior high school reported to their homerooms at 8:15 a.m., and shortly thereafter the
verses from the Bible were read over the public address system. Then
the children stood and repeated the Lord's Prayer under the direction
of the voice on the speaker. Next followed the Flag Salute, while the
children were standing, and finally the reading of school announcements. Students then dispersed to their various rooms for the first
classes of the day. In the Senior High School, the readers were
members of a Radio and Television Workshop, and were given the
privilege of choosing the verses for that day and the particular text
to be employed. At one time or another, the King James and 2Douay
7
Version of the Bible was used, and the Jewish Holy Scriptures.
The plaintiff Schempps, who are Unitarians, objected particularly
in the original action to the purveying by the reading of religious
doctrine which they could not accept, specifically the Divinity of
Christ, the Immaculate Conception, and the concepts of an anthropomorphic God and the Trinity. Except for Ellory, however, the oldest
child who was dropped from the second action, no complaint had
23. Schempp v. School Dist., 177 F.Supp. 398 (E.D. Penn. 1959).
24. A per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court, on the appeal from the
original decision, vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings under the amending statute. 364 U.S. 298.
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, sec. 15-1516 (1962).
26. Schempp v. School Dist., 201 F.Supp. 815, 817 (1962), citing to PA.
STAT. tit. 24, sec. 11-1122. (1962).
27. In the original action, the Superintendent of Abington Township Schools
testified that only the King James version of the Bible was purchased by the
school, and that one copy was Issued to each school teacher. Schempp v. School
Dist., 177 F.Supp. 398, 400, n.10 (1959). This practice apparently was followed in
the lower grades where the school was not equipped with a public address system,
and the reader's job fell upon the teacher or a student selected or volunteering
for that purpose.
28. Plaintiffs in the original action included the parents and three children
ranging In educational level from seventh grade to senior school. The oldest
child had graduated from senior high school by the time the second suit arose,
and the supplemental complaint amended him out of the action.
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ever been made to the school officials by the Schempps. 2 9 After the
statute was revised to provide for excusals, Mr. Schempp decided not
to take advantage of the new provision because of his apprehension
that the children would be labeled as "odd balls", or the religious
views of his family would be associated with atheism or Communism.
Furthemore, he feared that the morning absence would cut the children out of the announcements pertaining to school activities, which
followed the Bible reading, and relegate them to standing outside the
homeroom, a locale and posture implying they were being punished.
The expert testimony introduced at the first trial came from two
theologians and religious leaders engaged in work on the Jewish and
Christian Bibles. The first, a rabbi, pointed out the offensive nature
of the New Testament to Jews and stated the lack of comment with
the reading made it probable that psychological harm would be done
to the Jewish child. He also explained that the Jewish Holy Scriptures are materials for study and no significance is attached to the
mere reading of the Bible in Jewish thought. The witness for the
defendants, Dean Emeritus of the Yale Divinity School, expressed
the conclusion that the Bible was non-sectarian, which he later explained to mean non-sectarian within the Christian faiths. While
including the Jewish Holy Scriptures within the term "Holy Bible,"
he contended that the reading of Scriptures without the New Testament would constitute sectarianism.
In its initial decision, the three-judge court found both violations
of the no-establishment and religious freedom clauses. The establishment was found in the reading of a patently religious book, which
under the circumstances of the program, constituted an aid to all
religions (in that it dealt with man's relationship to God) and a
preference of the Christian religion (since the "holy Bible" is a
Christian document). In this regard, the McColum case was thought
controlling. In regard to the free exercise claim, the court found the
conduct compelled for both teachers and students, though no express
provision was made for sanctioning students who refused to participate. The inculcation of the religious beliefs contained in the readings,
however they might be received in the minds of various children,
would also intrude upon the rights of parents to determine the desired
religious or nonreligious formation of the child.
29. Ellory had resisted the program by reading the Koran during that
time, and refusing to stand for the Lord's Prayer. On seeing the Vice-Principal,
he was permitted to spend this period in the Guidance Counsellor's office during

part of one year. The following academic year, however, he was refused permission to absent himself. All of this took place before the amendment of the
statute, Schempp v. School Dist., 177 F.Supp. 398, 401 (1959).
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Amendment of the statute by the General Assembly of Pennsylvania did not change the plaintiff's dual theory of violation, but the
district court in its second decision chose to rely only on the establishment claim. The McCollum premise that religion and government
best achieve their aims if "left free from the other within its respective sphere" 30 still compelled the striking down of the program in
the court's view. Reverting to the wall of separation metaphor, the
court detected a breach in the state's requirement compelling the
reading of a Christian document, in a devotional atmosphere, in public school buildings.
Opinion of the Supreme Court
One of the criticisms of the Engle case, the immediate ancestor of the
Bible-reading cases, was the total lack of citation to precedent in the
majority opinion. Almost as if he were mounting a fresh campaign
31
to set doctrine straight, Justice Clark for the majority in Schempp
proliferates the references to past cases and a variety of legal issues.
But no serious effort is made to integrate past learning. Rather the
net effect is a patchwork quilt of dicta which scarely helps to bring
any recognizable pattern to the subject-matter. This is not to say
that the result wa s unexpected or novel, for Engle clearly foreshadowed the conclusion. But the Clark summary of existing law is
so preoccupied with pasting the past together in one coherent whole
that it never bothers to analyze or explain inconsistent and conflicting elements. In short, granting the disposition of the immediate
problem posed for its judgment, the Court does not noticeably improve the raggedness of doctrinal formulation in this area.
A concept of state neutrality in the relationship between man and
religion is the organizing construct of the majority opinion. After
32
several references to the religious composition of American society,
Justice Clark asserts two propositions previously established by
Supreme Court decisions which define the reach of the First Amendment. The first relates to the applicability of the provisions of the
Amendment to the states, through the Fourteenth Amendment, and is
dated as of 1940 with the decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut.3 3 The
second represents the rejection of the interpretation which makes
30. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
31. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
32. The opinion notes, e.g., sixty-four per cent of the American people
have church membership, with 3 per cent professing no religion whatever;
eighty-three separate religious bodies number over 50,000 adherents, with
numerous smaller groups. 374 U.S. 203, 213-14.
33. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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establishment equivalent to governmental preference for a particular
religion. The words of Everson v. Board of Education are repeated:
(n) either a state nor the Federal government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
34
religions or prefer one religion over another.
While these propositions had not been challenged in the instant cases,
Justice Clark admits, "others continue to question their history, logic
and efficacy. '' 36 For those of a skeptical mind concerning the now
orthodox view, a chilling ipse dixit falls:
Such contentions, in the light of the consistent interpretation in cases of this Court, seem entirely untenable and of
36
value only as academic exercises.
A canvass of the decisions since 1940 is undertaken to limn with
selective quotation the substance of the ban on religious establishment in its First Amendment context. The distinction between freedom to believe and freedom to exercise religious imperatives, set
down in Cantwell, is offered as a comment upon the interrelationship
of the establishment and free exercise clauses. 3 7 The Everson case
is employed to emphasize the neutral position of the state in the
matter of religious belief, for "state power is no more to be used so
as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them."' 38 From the dissenters in Everson is crystallized the meaning of this neutrality as it
affects public education, since the policy which recognizes the permissibility of religious observance simultaneously forbids the state
aiding in performing that function, which must then officially be considered a private function. The First Amendment is a requirement
not merely of equal treatment, but of an abstention from fusing the
diverse functions of government and religion, 3 9 so that the Government does not become involved in religious conflicts. While there
must be common sense of the matter, in the words of Justice Douglas
the separation of church and state must be complete and unequivocal
in the manner and ways defined in the Amendment. 4 0 This requires
34.
35.

374 U.S. 203, 217, (1963), quoting from the 1947 decision, 330 U.S. 1, 15.
374 U.S. 203, 217, (1963).

36. Ibid.
37. This interpretation some would consider a misapplication of the Cantwell teaching. See the Brennan characterization of this duality as a description
of the meaning of the free exercise clause alone, 374 U.S. 203, 253-54( concurring
opinion).
38. 330 U.S. 1, at 18 (1947).
39. The majority here cites Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in the McCollum decision, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1947).
40. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
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a broad interpretation in the light of history and the evils against
which the Amendment was designed. Such an interpretation brings
non-believer as well as the believer within the protection of the
Amendment as far as state action is concerned. 4 1 The state therefore may not get into the business of composing official prayers,
since the "first and most immediate" purpose of the establishment
clause "rested on a belief that a union of government and religion
tends to destroy government and to degrade religion."' 4 2 As a practical consequence of this learning, the operation of the establishment
clause cannot be made to depend upon the direct coercion of individuals nor a showing of direct governmental compulsion.
With this discursive review of prior cases as a background, Justice
Clark turns to a summing up of the First Amendment's scope. "Neutrality" stems from the Court's recognition of two factors: 1) the
danger of a fusion between government and religion "or a concept or
dependency of one upon the other to the end that official support of
the State or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets
of one or of all orthodoxies."; 43 2) the value of religious training,
teaching and observance and "more particularly, the right of every
person to freely choose his own course with reference thereto, free of
any compulsion from the state."' 4 4 The former element is, of course,
the area for application of the establishment clause, while the latter
evokes the guarantees of the free exercise clause. Since the two
clauses may overlap, some statement of their ultimate jurisdiction is
necessary. In general, the establishment clause withdraws all legislative power respecting religious belief and its expression, while the
free exercise clause withdraws from legislative power the exertion of
any restraint upon the free exercise of religion. But what are the
tests by which the essence of the dual prohibition is discovered? The
validity of legislation under the establishment clause is determinable
so:

...what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion
then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as
circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there
must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect
45
that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
41.
42.

Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).

43.

School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).

44.

Ibid.

45.

Id.
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On the other hand, the free exercise clause measures challenged legislation under a standard of coercion: it must be shown that the
enactment has a coercive effect as it operates against the individual
in the practice of his religion.
Applying the establishment test to the Bible reading program before the Court, Justice Clark notes that the exercises are prescribed
for students required by law to attend school and held in buildings
under the supervisions of state employees, the teachers. The religious
character of the exercise is patent. In the Schempp case, the lower
court had so found; in the Murray case, not only could the demurrer
be taken as an admission of that fact, but on the merits the facts disclose that the Bible is being utilized as an instrument for religiouk
purposes. The excusal provision is irrelevant since the charge is
Establishment.
A measure of the failure of the opinion to illuminate the recesses
of doctrinal opacity may be found in the fact that ultimately the
Court seems to accept the way of formulating the issue which the
Court of Appeals of Maryland used. The matter was "somewhere between McCoglum and Zorach."4 6 And this particular opinion does
not offer much by way of explanation of the result other than the
view that the Bible Reading program lies closer to McCoflum. 4 7

Each of the three concurring opinions manifest a distinct and
different attitude toward the issues. 4 8 Justice Douglas reiterates the
very narrow ground of state expenditure which he would make an
auxiliary touchstone for the determination of establishment. No
matter how small the amount of state funds which can be isolated for
purposes of allocating a cost, it would constitute a violation of the
First Amendment since it would give "any church, or all churches,
greater strength in our society than it would have by relying on its
members alone." 4 9 By contrast, the opinion of Justice Goldberg, in
which Justice Harlan joins, takes a broad, almost philosophical, tone
toward the problem. The task of assessing neutrality is a difficult
one, for the basic purpose of the constitutional standard "is to promote and assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and
46. See text at not 17, supra.
47. Undoubtedly it does. The factors of school premises, involvement of
teacher, and minute financial cost to the state all are present here and In
McCollum as they were not in Zorach.
48. The lengthy concurrence of Justice Brennan, School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, at 230 (1963), is a major effort to state his own church-state
philosophy, including a comprehensive discussion of the past decisions. References
will be made to the arguments of this opinion throughout this article.
49. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 229 (1963), (concurring opinion).
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tolerance for all and nurture the conditions which secure the best
hope of attainment of that end." 50 The Constitution would prohibit
the type of passivity which amounts to hostility for religion, and
any attempt to avoid the delicate judgment necessary to determine
what the the "required and permissible accommodations between
church and state," 5 ' in the quest for simple and clear measures of
judgment, would be a disloyalty to the ultimate objective of religious
liberty.
The dissent of Justice Stewart is a root disagreement with the prevailing view on the meaning of neutrality as a harmonizing concept
between establishment and religious freedom. Accepting the applicability of the establishment clause to the states, he nevertheless
emphasizes that the central value embodied in the First Amendment
is the individual freedom to exercise his religion free of state interference. He then argues that a free exercise claim of some substance
is open to those who desire to have the school day open with Bible
reading, as well as those who do not.
For a compulsory state educational system so structures a
child's life that if religious exercises are held to be an impermissible activity in schools, religion is placed at an artificial and state-created disadvantage. 5 2
True neutrality would require permission for these exercises, as long
as the conditions under which the program was implemented did not
result in coercion of those who object.
The constituent questions which such an approach pose are handled
one by one. First, the legislation at issue must be presumed to permit the substitution of different sets of religious readings in conformance with requests of parents. In this regard Justice Stewart relies
on the absence of any indication that such requests would not be
acted upon by the administrators of the program, and the variations
in readings revealed in the facts of the Schempp case. Second, and
assuming the flexibility regarding the material to be read, the structure of the school environment must be such that no pressures are
put upon any child to participate in the exercise. Thus a program
without excusal provisions would obviously be invalid. But even with
excusal provisions, if the exercises were held during the school day
some equally desirable alternative must be available for students who
choose not to participate, so that psychological compulsion would not
result in unwilling compliance. Specifically, Justice Stewart men50. Id. at 305 (concurring opinion).
51.

Id. at 306 (concurring opinion).

52.

Id.

at 313 (dissenting opinion).
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tions the possibility of holding the exercises before or after school
for those children who desire to participate: as an example of compulsion under an excusal program, he mentions the possibility that
the timing of school announcements after the religious program
would induce children to attend the entire exercise in order not to
miss the announcements.
Under the dissenting view, the records in both cases are inadequate
for purposes of a decision, and both should be remanded for further
proceedings in regard to the aspect of coercion. At the end of the
opinion comes a major concession on the practicality of the approach:
It is conceivable that these school boards, or even all school
boards, might eventually find it impossible to administer a
system of religious exercises during school hours in such a
way as to meet this constitutional standard-in such a way
as completely to free from any kind of official coercion those
53
who do not affirmatively want to participate.
THE UNEMPLOYED SABBATARIAN
While the Bible-reading cases centered on the establishment clause
of the First Amendment, Sherbert v. Verner 5 4 was decided on the
other element in American church-state formulation, the right to
free exercise of religion. Broadly stated, the issue concerned the unemployment compensation claims of a Sabbatarian who was deprived
of work by her religious convictions when a six-day week went in
effect in local textile mills.
Under South Carolina statute, an unemployed insured worker is
eligible for compensation benefits only if "he is able to work and
available for work."'5 5 Such a person is disqualified from some or all
the benefits, moreover, if "he has been discharged for misconduct
connected with his most recent work" 5 6 or fails "without good cause
. . . to accept available suitable work when offered him. .. ." 57 In
determining the suitability of the work offered the individual, the
state Commission is directed to consider "the degree of risk involved

to his health, safety and morals. .. 58
The claimant in the Sherbert case had worked for a textile Mill in
South Carolina for some 35 years. In 1957 she became a member of
at 320

(dissenting opinion).

53.

Id.

54.

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

55.

S.C. Code Sec. 68-113 (3)

56.

Id.

57.

Id. sec. 68-114 (3)

58.

Id.

sec. 68-114

sec. 68-114

(2)..

(3)

(a).
(b).

(1952).
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the Seventh Day Adventist Church, which teaches that the Sabbath
begins at sundown Friday and ends at sundown Saturday. In 1959
her employer changed the hours of all work shifts and so made Saturday work mandatory where it had previously been on a voluntary
basis. After failing to report for six consecutive Saturdays, she was
discharged. Attempts to obtain acceptable work in other mills proved
unsuccessful, since textile plants in the area were generally on a
six-day week, and a claim was filed for unemployment compensation.
A claims examiner found that at the time of discharge the claimant was unavailable for work, and further that she was not at the
time of the hearing available for work in the textile industry in that
area. A disqualification of five weeks ineligibility was imposed under
the terms of the statute. Two appeals within the administrative
agency proved unavailing. The ruling of disqualification was upheld
by a common pleas court and ultimately came to the Supreme Court
of South Carolina.
The state supreme court, with one judge dissenting, pitched its
decision on the factor of statutory construction, agreeing with the
Commission that the claimant did not qualify under the law since she
was unavailable for work. 5 9 Religious motivation for refusing to
accept work which required Saturday employment was in effect
deemed not a "good cause." The policy statement of the statute revealed the basic purpose of the legislation to be protection against
economic insecurity due to involuntary employment. From this perspective, the reliance by the claimant on personal reasons for her
failure to retain (or accept) employment in the mills became immaterial. Eligibility for benefits should be tested by "whether or not
the claimant is actually and currently attached to the labor market,
which in this case is unrestricted availability for work." 60 Citing
other cases, both from South Carolina and other states, the court
emphasized that the concept of availability, upon which the benefits
hinged, was not subject to qualification by personal conditions imposed by the applicant. Just.as a mother who is unable to work certain shifts because of problems in obtaining a baby-sitter during that
time may not claim unemployment benefits, so the petitioner by accepting the responsibilities of membership in the Seventh Day Adventist Church could not vary the requirement of availability essential to qualify under the statute. Against the claim that such an
interpretation violated religious freedom, the state court contented
itself with a summary denial; it also suggested that the allowance
59.

Sherbert v. Verner, 240 S.C. 286, 125 S.E.2d 737 (1962).

60.

Id. at 741.
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of compensation might constitute discrimination in favor of persons
61
motivated by religious beliefs.
Opinion of the Supreme Court
Where the state court opinion was predominantly a confrontation of
the complexities of statutory construction, leaving for a passing reference the constitutional claims, the Supreme Court opinion was
grounded in a consideration of the imperatives of the free exercise
clause. As Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, framed the
constitutional standard, the disqualification imposed on the appellant
occasioned by her religious convictions could be justified only if it
represented no restraint on her free exercise of religion, or if such
restraint was justified by some compelling state interest.
That the disqualification imposed a burden upon religious exercise
required little argument for "the ruling forces her to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the
one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order
to accept work, on the other hand." 62 The circumstances that the
restraint was achieved through withholding a benefit or privilege,
rather than through direct action by the state, was held immaterial
in view of the importance of the constitutional rights at stake. Just
as the state may not condition a tax exemption on loyalty oaths which
may discourage the exercise of free speech, so is it limited in coupling
a welfare benefit with standards which effectively penalize free exercise of religion. Justice Brennan notes that the state statute protects the conscience of the Sunday worshipper by a provision that
employees who refuse during time of national emergency to work
Sunday shifts authorized by the state commissioner of labor shall not
lose their seniority. 6 3 Thus, he argues, the burden placed on the
Sabbatarian by the compensation statute is practically avoided for
61. The dissenting opinion in the state court challenged the soundness of
the construction given the statute by the majority and the commission. He
thought the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner tenable enough to demand more consideration than they had received. To distinguish prior cases
in which inability to work resulting from personal factors had disqualified
claimants, the dissenter pointed out that the employer, not the employee, had
made the critical change in this case. Since the applicant was available to
continue the work she had been doing prior to the change in work schedule,
the question became whether the work now offered was "suitable" work. In
this connection the dissenter thought a relevant provision in the status was
the requirement that the commission consider the degree of risk to morals
involved in a particular job. Id. at 746-53.
62. 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
63.

S.C. CODE sec. 64-4 (1952).
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the Sunday worshipper, and a note of religious discrimination introduced.
Turning to the possibility that a state interest of sufficient magnitude might justify the infringement of religious freedom which is
present, Justice Brennan considers the contention that fraudulent
claims based of religious affiliation may multiply, sapping the compensation fund, if exemptions must be made on these grounds. A
further consideration is the difficulty employers may experience in
scheduling Saturday work, if Sabbatarians are to be accommodated.
But neither of these arguments had been made in the lower court, and
the Court is dubious of their merit. Justice Brennan refers to the
difficulties in an approach which would require judicial probing of the
truthfulness of religious affirmations of claimants. Beyond that, the
possibility of deception in claims would still necessitate establishing
that no alternative methods (other than disqualification of appli64
cants) would serve to remedy that problem.
The opinion of the majority is closed with a customary note in the
church-state field, a denial that certain implications may be found in
the result. Justice Brennan first denies that the holding of the majority
"establishes" the Seventh-day Adventist religion in South Carolina.
Neither does the Court purport to say anything about whether the
state must provide these types of benefits to all classes of citizen ab
initio. The decision is merely that "South Carolina may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions so as to constrain a worker
65
to abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest."
A final refuge is sought in a principle enunciated in Everson, that no
State may exclude from welfare programs members of any category
of religious or non-religious convictions "because of their faith, or

lack of

it.

''

66

Justice Stewart, who in lonely dissent has resisted the flowering of
the no-establishment theory as developed in past opinions, seized this
64. The Sunday Closing Law Cases, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), present an obvious
analogy to the Sherbert issue in terms of the free exercise claim. The majority
distinguishes these cases on the ground that the state had a strong interest in
providing one uniform day of rest, a factor which has no counterpart in Sherbert.
The burden imposed upon Sabbatarians by the requirement he stay closed on
another day of the week is considered "less direct" than the denial of unemployment payments, an assertion which draws the fire of Justice Stewart, School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 at 417 (1963), (concurring opinion) and Justice
Harlan, at 421 (dissenting opinion).
65. 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963). Justice Brennan takes the precaution to remark
that the case does not concern religious convictions which make believers nonproductive members of society.
66.

330 U.S. 1, at 16 (1947).
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occasion in concurrence 6 7 to illustrate what he belives is a "doublebarreled dilemma" of judicial reasoning:
Because the appellant refuses to accept available jobs which
would require her to work on Saturdays, South Carolina has
declined to pay unemployment compensation benefits to her.
Her refusal to work on Saturdays is based on the tenets of
her religious faith. The Court says that South Carolina cannot under these circumstances declare her to be not "available for work" within the meaning of its statute because to
do so would violate her constitutional right to the free exercise of her religion.
Yet what this Court has said about the Establishment Clause
must inevitably lead to a diametrically opposite result. If
the appellant's refusal to work on Saturdays were based on
indolence, or on a compulsive desire to watch the Saturday
television programs, no one would say that South Carolina
could not hold that she was not "available for work" within
the meaning of its statute. That being so, the Establishment
Clause as construed by this Court not only permits but
affimatively requires South Carolina equally to deny the appellant's claim for unemployment compensation when her
refusal to work on Saturdays is based upon her religious
creed.68
Indicting the establishment decisions as mechanistic and empty
rhetoric, Justice Stewart calls for "an atmosphere of hospitality and
' 69
accommodation to individual belief or disbelief."
The implications of the decision are disturbing to the two dissenters, Justices Harlan and White. They locate the essence of the majority holding in the requirement that states carve out exceptions
based on religion for those who would otherwise be unable to participate in the welfare programs. Conduct motivated by religion is thus
singled out and given special attention, although individuals who for
any other reason cannot comply with the welfare standards are dis67. In a separate concurrence, Justice Douglas strikes a characteristic note
by finding the problem a simple one, and the answer, certain. He finds an
interference with the individual conscience since South Carolina is requiring
Sabbatarians to conform with the "scruples of the majority" to obtain public
benefits. While the individual may not demand a sum of money from government
to support his religious beliefs, neither can the government "exact from me a
surrender of one iota of my religious scruples." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
412 (1963). The reason that the result does not constitute an establishment in the
Douglas view is that the money goes to an unemployed worker and not a religious
organization.
68.
69.

374 U.S. 398, 114-15. (1963) (concurring opinion).
Id. at 415-16 (concurring opinion).
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regarded. Justice Harlan refers to the suggestion that such singling
out of religion may itself exceed constitutional limitations, but expresses the view that the state-might as a "permissible accommodation of religion" grant such an exemption. The minority, however,
object to requiring this "direct financial assistance to religion" as a
constitutional right.7 0
EVALUATION OF THE CASES
Doubtlessly, sophistication in the law is manifested by the ability to
detect critical degrees and shades of difference between one situation
and another, and thus mark the boundaries of rules. The Court, however, assuming that it wisely exercised its function in reaching the
results announced in Schempp and Sherbert, has been saddled with
the additional duty of explaining through its opinion the reasons why
a particular conclusion is legally sound. A striking feature of the
two decisions under scrutiny, which appeared the same day from the
hand of the same Court, is the seeming diffidence of the majorities to
face up to what are some interesting, if not insoluble, problems of
reconciliation. The Court almost displays the same woodenness about
the relationship of the two cases as the judge in the story of Justice
Holmes. A Vermont justice of the peace had a case before him in
which one farmer sued another for breaking a churn. "The Justice
took time to consider and then said that he had looked through the
statutes and could find nothing about churns and gave judgment for
the defendant." 7 1 In somewhat the same way, the Supreme Court
acts for all practical purposes as if the establishment issue of the
Schempp case had nothing to do with the free exercise issue of Sherbert. Yet a stranger unexposed to the subtleties of Church-state
jurisprudence might justifiably ask for a statement of why precisely
the state was required to pay compensation claims of a person because of his religious beliefs, and condemned for sponsoring a Biblereading program because of its religious content.
It is true, of course, that the judge in Holmes' parable was seduced
by the factual differences between the case before him and others in
the books, while the Supreme Court had in tandem cases that under
past doctrine evoked different legal rules. Yet these are merely two
different forms of the ultimate problem of subsuming situations that
are basically similar under a common legal principle and distinguishing others that are not. The Vermont justice could not see the single
legal rule that governed because he was hypnotized by the physical
object of dispute. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, appears
70.

Id. at 423 (dissenting opinion).

71. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
326, 342 (Fuller ed. 1949).
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ready to blink away the great factual similarities in the two cases
because it is bewitched by the variance in legal formula under which
they are presented.7 2 But why does the Bible-reading situation
qualify as an establishment issue rather than one of free-exercise?
Why is Sherbert a question of free exercise rather than establishment? The inquiries are not directed to the technical questions of
what issues the parties raised or preserved in these cases. Nor are
they intended to challenge the consistency in application of precedents
which have followed the same distinction in resolving other matters.
The question being raised goes deeper, by way of asking how the two
clauses of the First Amendment interlock and relate, and jointly
serve the purposes of religious freedom.
To be sure, each of the majority opinions takes the occasion to deny
flatly that the Court is violating the other clause of the First Amendment by finding a violation of the clause with which it is dealing.
Justice Clark dismisses the contention, urged by the dissenter Justice
Stewart, that the elimination of Bible reading from public schools
interferes with the rights of a majority to exercise freely their
religion.
... [W] e cannot accept that the concept of neutrality, which
does not permit a State to require a religious exercise even
with the consent of the majority of those affected, collides
with the majority's right to free exercise of religion. While
the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state
action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has
never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the
73
State to practice its beliefs.
Similarly, Justice Brennan rejects any claim that the Seventh Day
Adventist religion is being established by his opinion in the Sherbert
case, though the single basis for requiring payment of compensation
is a religious reason.
In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the "establishment" of the Seventh-day Adventist religion in South
Carolina, for the extension of unemployment benefits to
Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects
nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality
in the face of religious differences, and does not represent
72. The law purifies and refines its doctrine not only by absorbing common
factual situations under one legal rule or principle, but also by recognizing that
separate legal rules that create friction in case decisions when applied to a
succession of factual settings may themselves require integration or harmonization by a supervening standard.
73.

School Dist v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963).
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that involvement of religious with secular institutions which
74
it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall.
Are these disclaimers any more than assertions that "the law says
nothing about churns"? Isn't the petitioner in Sherbert using the
compensation "machinery" of the state to practice his beliefs, and
won't the state require that he implement his claim by practicing his
religion if he hopes to keep his exemption? On the other hand, why
does not the voluntary Bible-reading program represnt "nothing more
than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious
differences"? These inquiries are not raised to challenge the results of
these decisions but to seek understanding. As a matter of principle,
why should the state be constitutionally required to recognize the
factor of religious belief in the allocation of one public benefit (unemployment payments), and constitutionally prohibited from acknowledging religious convictions in another (public schools).
Is this last statement of the question an adequate one, however?
An immediate objection which occurs is the characterization of the
Bible-reading program as only a recognition of existing religious belief. When a state requires its teachers to begin the class with such
an exercise, the objection might run, it is no longer merely acknowledging claims of individual students as to religous conviction but is
now taking an active role in implementing those convictions. One is
tempted to go further and say that the state is compelling the religious observance, but the immediate reservation which is called forindeed the one element in both the Regents prayer and the Bible reading which creates enormous analytical difficulty-is that the programs are voluntary as to student participation. 7 5 The nub of the
reluctance to designating the state action as recognition, then, is the
fact that the state ordains the holding of the exercise, that it requires
that the reading take place whether anyone chooses to participate or
not, and that its agent teacher participates. But as thus constituted,
how does the Bible-reading differ from the provision for exemption
from disqualification which the Sherbert case imposes upon state compensation programs? Justice Brennan refers to the numerous state
court and administrative rulings which have qualified persons for
compensation benefits who because of religious convictions have re74. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409. (1963).
75. The Court accepts as a fact in the case the quality of voluntariness,
its conclusion being that excusal provisions furnish no defense to an establishment claim. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963). In the
Regents Prayer Case, where class recitation of a non-denominational prayer
composed by state officials was declared an establishment, Justice Douglas emphasized the freedom of the student to refuse to take part. Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 438 (1962) (concurring opinion).

1964]

'THE ESTABLISHMENT SYNDROME

fused available work. 7 6 Such rulings represent official governmental
actions which ordain the granting of concessions designed to permit
individuals effectively to exercise their religious freedom. The state
does not require that individuals take advantage of these provisions
and thus implement their religious convictions, but then neither does
the state make such a requirement in the Bible-reading situation,
either, under the assumptions of fact mentioned above.
One outstanding difference, though, is the guidance (if not personal
participation) by the teacher in the spiritual exercise of the school.
The teacher is there at the front of the class and she is a focus for
organization and performance of the ritual. The situation is quite
different, presumably, in effectuation of the compensation scheme.
The exercise of religious conviction on the Sabbath or some other day
does not occur on public premises. Neither is it lead by a state officials. Are these material differences in distinguishing the two involvements on the basis of principle? Would it make any difference
if the clerk in the claims office routinely asked whether the unavailability of the worker was related to a religious reason? 7 7 Would it
take the sting out of the Bible-reading program if the teacher was
not permitted to assist, and the children would meet by themselves at
some predesignated room in the school?
In exploring these matters, one must be careful not to become a
victim of his method of phrasing the issue. Suppose, for example, that
the Sherbert issue arose as a result of the state of South Carolina
writing into its statute an express exemption from disqualification for
all unemployed who for religious reasons were unable to work on
certain days. Would such deliberate legislative concern for the integrity of the individual conscience constitute a use of the apparatus
of the state to help someone practice his religion?7 8 Would it differ
in any important respect from an attempt to accommodate diverse
76. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407, n.7 (1963).
77. In his concurring opinion in Schempp, Justice Brennan expresses the
view that excusal provisions necessarily operate to infringe the free exercise of
religion because they require a student to profess publicly his belief or disbelief.
School Dist. v Schempp 374 U.S. 203, 288-89 (1963). Would that also be true in a
compensation program if the applicant must request the exemption from disqualification based on religion? Note by way of contrast the fear of special treatment based on religious affiliation as expressed by Justice Jackson in Everson V.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 25 (1947) (dissenting opinion) and Justice Rutledge in
the same case at 61, n.56 (dissenting opinion).
78. See Commonwealth v. Arlan's Dept. Store, Inc., 357 S.W.2d 708 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1962), appeal dismissed 371 U.S. 218 (1962). An appeal from a state
court decision upholding the constitutionality of exemptions from a Sunday
closing law based on religious observance of day other than Sunday, dismissed
for want of a substantial federal question.
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groups who wish to have their children pray during the school day in
a public school?
By way of contrast, suppose the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
passed a law specifically prohibiting any use of the school day by
students or teachers for purposes of prayer or spiritual exercises. 7 9
Would not such a legislative act directly retard the practice of religion? How would it differ from a state decision to disregard the
factor of religion in distributing its unemployment fund?
Abstract questions such as these may be mischievous precisely because they neglect to consider the enormous factual differences of the
programs before the Court. Semantically it may be permissible to
compare the public classroom with the claims office, but the particular
consequences of the intrusion of a religious element into each are
quite diverse. A public program of education for the young is obviously something entirely different in its social, political and cultural
importance than is a law, passed during the depression, with the objective of providing economic aid to workers so that industrial stability will be promoted. Adults use the claims office, while immature
children peculiarly susceptible to suggestion and example are the
denizens of the schools. 8 0
These are unquestionably important matters for detailed and serious pondering, out of which a practical judgment might be reached
that the religion factor should be excluded from one, included in
another. Yet if the preliminary query is, simply, what is the relevance
of religion as an element for consideration by the state in the performance of certain functions properly within its power, no a priori
reasons appears why recognition of spiritual concerns has a greater
claim in the field of industrial compensation than it has in education.
Quite the contrary might seem to be the case. Historically, at least,
religious exercises as well as other means of character training have
been accepted as important parts of the educational experience. 8 1
79. See Stein v. Oshinsky (USDC NY Dec. 20, 1963) ruling that a
voluntary prayer offered by school children without any legal compulsion or
prescription, is not an establishment. Compare the dismissal for want of a
federal question of an appeal challenging a provision in a state constitution
banning Bible-reading in the public schools, Washington ex rel. Clithero v.
Showalter, 284 U.S. 573 (1931).
80. Should the relevance of the individual's maturity on the question of
the effect of state involvements open the question of whether persons receiving
unemployment compensation benefits, as a class, are more susceptible to subtle
religious influences created by such a program than are other groups in the
society ?
81. As Justice Rutledge noted in Everson, "Indeed, the view is sincerely
avowed by many of various faiths, that the basic purpose of all education is
or should be religious, that the secular cannot be and should not be separated
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Furthermore, the pressures which compel attendance at a public
school and so pre-empt time which might be used for religious instruction are legal in nature, while an unemployment program is not compulsory and takes effect upon voluntary application by individuals
driven by economic necessity. Good reasons may exist for distinguishing prayer in public school from accommodations of welfare beneficiaries based on religious grounds, but the inherent impropriety of
spiritual formation as part of education does not appear to be one of
them.
It may be maintained, however, that the true ground for distinguishing the two cases is the manner by and purpose for which the
religious element is intruded into the public realm. When the Biblereading was mandated by statute, the state was the prime mover and
the direct target of its action was an exercise indisputably religious
in character. In contrast, the benefits of unemployment compensation
provided by the state do not on their face reflect any interest at all in
religion. Only by way of response to the predicament created by the
state preoccupation with and effect on economic matters does the provision arise for special treatment based on religious considerations.
While the government in the Sherbert situation comes reluctantly to
treatment of religious difference only because its action has changed
economic patterns and inadvertently disadvantaged the religious
claimant, the state in Schempp consciously intends to regulate religious matters by the very statute which is the focus of litigation. The
distinction urged is a provocative one, paralleling the theory sometimes advanced that the First Amendment significance of state action varies in accordance with whether the legislative purpose is religious or secular.
On closer analysis, however, it becomes evident that the apparent
clarity of the distinguishing not of purpose in regard to state action
begins to blur. When a state legislature initiates a program of Biblereading it is not undertaking to bring children together for the purpose of the prayer. Rather the program is incorporated into a preexisting secular assembly hopefully staged to produce educated citizens. Children are already brought together for the civil objective of
education; what is added is the religious element, on a voluntary basis
and with regard for diversity of creeds. The point here is made
clearly by assuming that the legislation regarding Bible reading is
made a proviso to the statutory section setting up a system of public
schools, which in turn is part of a compulsory school law. This governfrom the religious phase and emphasis." 330 U.S. 1, 46 (1947) (dissenting
opinion). The role of religion in the development of the nation's educational
institutions is set forth by Justice Frankfurter in the McCo~um case, 333 U.S.

203, 212 (1948)

(concurring opinion).
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mental activity is primarily directed to achieving literacy and educational goals for the secular society, and the provision for religious
exercise might conceivably be no more than a recognition that changes
introduced in societal patterns by the compulsory school regime.
In a similar vein, when an attempt is made to justify the result in
the Sherbert case by reliance on the inherently secular purpose of the
compensation plan itself, the argument must conveniently disregard
the conscious advertence to religion which, according to that case, the
constitution itself requires. However an exemption is wrought for
persons unavailable for employment because of religious reasonswhether through legislative enactment or judicial construction-the
state agency performing the task has as its immediate objective the
subject of religion. The whole purpose of the exempting provision or
decision is to regulate the religious significance of the governmental
action.
It would be convenient to be able to reason from the premise that
the state may never take the factor of religion under its consideration, but such a rule would seriously endanger the free exercise of
religion, as Sherbert concludes. Yet if one starts with a willingness to
allow state action which takes religion into account, where shall the
limits be set? The modern state has an influence, direct or indirect,
in every facet of contemporary life. When does the state interest in
religion become impermissible?
ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE EXERCISE
As preliminary considerations, the queries and speculations of the
preceding pages may not appear totally irrelevant to those who have
experienced the difficulty of trying to organize and relate the various
strains of judicial thought in this area. Admittedly the insouciant
and free-wheeling manner of the last section ignores the traditional
legal approach of harmonizing and reconciling opinions and past cases.
But the purpose of this article is not to etch out patterns of judicial
development,8 2 or even to advance a formulated key to understanding
the religious clauses, 8 3 but simply to suggest a perspective from
82. For recent reviews and syntheses of Supreme Court decisions in this
area, see Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relationship Between the
"Establishment" and "Free Exercise" Clauses, 42 TEX. L. REV. 142-198;
(1963); KURLAND, op. cit. supra note 2; DRINAN, RELIGION, THE COURTS AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1963); THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (Oaks ed. 1963)';

Fernandez, "Free Exercise of Religion, 36 SO. CALIF. L. REV. 546 (1963).
83. KURLAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 17: "These commands would be
impossible of effectuation unless they are read together as creating a doctrine
more akin to the reading of the equal protection clause than to the due process
clause, i.e., they must be read to mean that religion may not be used as a basis
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which some of the current confusion may be understood and assessed. A new look, unencumbered by the baggage of the past, may
enable us to see things previously overlooked.
An initial insight for that purpose is an understanding of the type
of enterprise upon which the High Court is embarked. Without
challenging in any way the Court's questionable transference of the
establishment standard to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, one must nevertheless discern that the functions which will now
be performed by the First Amendment in this area are vastly different
from its function as originally conceived. Whatever the philosophies
of the men who drafted and achieved the adoption of the Amendment,
no doubt exists that its first application was merely as a principle of
federalism. 8 4 The most superficial investigation of the discussion in
the various state conventions to ratify the Constitution, and a perusal
of the legislative history of the Amendment itself, clearly indicate by
the lack of extended discussion that the Amendment did not purport
to set out any national consensus upon a full and detailed theory of
church-state relationships. 8 5 Indeed it was because the states still
maintained their enormous powers to determine how religion and
government should stand toward each other, that the amendment to
neutralize interference by the new government seemed relatively uncontroversial.
Precisely what the framers of the Amendment were able to avoid
by the Amendment-a national debate and confrontation of the infinite number of views of the sacred-profane dichotomy in a pluralist
nation-the Supreme Court has inspired by its conclusion that the
religious clauses apply in their full content and form to the states.
The Court is now engaged in articulating a national philosophy, applifor classification for purposes of governmental action, whether that action be
the conferring of rights or privileges or the imposition of duties or obligations."

84.

For varying views on the historic meaning of the establishment clause,

see PARSONS, THE FIRST FREEDOM (1948); PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM (1953); O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

(1949); Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1
CATH. LAw, 301 (1955); Kruse, The HistoricalMeaning and Judicial Construction
of the Establishment of Religion Clause, 2 WASHBURN, L. J. 65 (1962).
85. The debates in the states on the proposal to adopt the Constitution
contain relatively few references to the matter of religious freedom, a reflection of the understanding that the central government was not being given

any power in that area. Some delegates to the ratifying conventions, however,
proposed that express protection be afforded against the deprivation of liberty
of conscience by the new government. ELLIOTT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE CONSTITUTION (2nd ed. 1907). By way of sample of state resolutions on
religion, see ratification of South Carolina, ELLIOT, op. Cit. supra at 325, New
Hampshire, at 326, Virginia at 327, New York at 328.
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cable to every region and citizen, of the political terms under which
church and state coexist. As long as the nature and dimensions of
that enterprise are appreciated, no objections are here made to the
wisdom of undertaking it.
Neither Bible-reading in the schools or state unemployment compensation schemes were within the reach of the religion clauses when
it was adopted in 1791. The Bill of Rights applied only to the federal
government, and the welfare state in most of its forms is a creature
unknown to the 18th century mind. But history does not stand still,
and hence constitutions must be flexibly interpreted and their meaning milked with a due consideration for the purposes they serve. At
least to the extent that deprivation of the religious liberty of an individual constitutes violations of due process or equal protection, it is
impossible to argue with the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment made the protections of the First applicable to the states.8 6
And the more tenuous grounds upon which the non-establishment
standard is also fused into the Fourteenth Amendment may also be
accepted on one of the several grounds suggested by the Court.8 7 But
the same philosophy which supports the right of the Court to meet
the exigencies of history by interpretations which are creative and
enlivening, demands that the Justices be realistic enough to understand what role they are playing.
Whit gives point to a study and comparison of the Schempp and
Sherbert cases is not any necessary intimation that these cases were
incorrectly decided, but what they indicate about the vexing inadequacies of much of contemporary judicial reasoning. If the Court is
going to hammer out a standard of church-state relationships which
86. See HOWE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION, IN RELIGION AND THE FREE
SOCIETY 49 (1958).
87. Justice Clark cites a free exercise case, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940) as the original authority for the proposition that the establishment clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963). See note 37, supra. In his concurrence

in the same case, Justice Brennan meets the argument that establishment cannot apply to the states because the purpose of the First Amendment was to
protect the states in their power to establish, by pointing out by 1868 such a
purpose was an anachronism. All formal state establishments were abolished
three decades before the Fourteenth Amendment, and this outmoded original
purposes of the First Amendment could not have deterred the absorption of
the clause into the due process standard. Further, he argues that the establishment clause is a "coguarantor" of religious liberty, and neither one of the
clauses can protect freedom alone, Schempp, supra at 255-56. Compare Justice
Frankfurter's explanation in his Sunday closing law cases opinion, McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 460 (1961)

(concurring opinion), that the "presupposi-

tions of our society" infuse into due process the recognition "that a government
must neither establish nor suppress religious belief."
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is expressive of the structure and complexities of the society around
it, the chances of its success in this endeavor will ultimately depend
upon its appreciation of Hamilton's remark that it has "neither force
nor will, but merely judgment."18 8 Until the Court is ready to fulfill
the difficult task of producing objective and comprehensive standards
by which to serve the several values of the Amendment, its decisions
give promise of stimulating more divisiveness than they foreclose.
There are two objects of attention which the Amendment by its
wording makes obvious intersections of thought and opinion: establishment and free exercise. The delicate position in which the Court
finds itself in arbitrating the meaning of those concepts can only be
appreciated if one accepts the unpalatable fact that no pre-packaged
meanings are contained in the two clauses. For those who dogmatically assert that the scope of each phrase is indubitably fixed, no further discussion is necessary or desirable. But if the ambiguities of
history are recognized, the analytical problems in interpreting and
accomodating the two ideas are numerous. In the first place, whenever the Court interposes its authority between the state and an individual and finds a violation of free exercise rights, it is resorting to
religion as the primary object of its concern. Yet it asserts that matters of religious belief are outside the competence of government. On
the other hand, when the Court concludes that a particular involvement between state and religion is an establishment, it thereby restricts the freedom of those who for religious reasons want the particular state program being challenged. Yet it asserts that the state
(which it represents in its decisions) cannot impose burdens on the
free exercise of religion.
What is the relationship between the two parts of the First Amendment? More specifically, what are their respective constitutional
roles in achieving the state neutrality on religion which the Court in
Schempp says in their unitary objective? One might say that free
exercise protects any manifestation or practice of religion, or action
on its behalf, which does not constitute through its capture of the
political processes an "establishment." Or one might alternately say
that establishment prohibits all links between religion and the state
which are not specifically brought within the prohibition against the
state interference with free exercise. 8 9 Either of these interpreta88.
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89. The relationship between the two clauses is sometimes geared to a
determination of which is dominant and which subsidiary. "There are three
ways of viewing this relationship: the establishment clause may be considered
subsidiary and a means to the free exercise guaranty, or it may be considered
independent and of equal weight, or the two may be considered unitary, two
sides of the same coin, as it were." Pfeffer, Some Current Issues in Church
and state, 13 WESTERN RES. L. REV. 9, 32 (1961).

See also THE WALL BETWEEN
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tions assumes that all forms of religious activity is within one or the
other of the constitutional phrases, but they put a different emphasis
on which is to occupy the larger part of the First Amendment grounds.
But in fact the First Amendment does not protect religious freedom
by a grammatically comprehensive coverage of all forms of activities
having a spiritual focus. The Constitution merely prohibits two specific forms of state action. Religious freedom is achieved because the
state prohibited from passing laws respecting an establishment, and
from interfering with the free exercise of religion. Unless the individual uses his religious freedom is collaboration with others to
force the state into an establishment, he is presumably free to do
whatever he wishes. Unless the state acts in a way that interferes
with a citizen's free exercise of his religion, it can proceed to regulate
any area (as the religious caluses are concerned). Conceivably, then,
an area of religious concern lies between establishment (what the
state cannot do in regard to religion, no matter how many people in
the society desire it) and free exercise (what the state cannot impose
upon an individual to impede the exercise of his religion) which the
Constitution leaves free to determination however the political consensus dictates.
Since the free exercise clause is the traditional vehicle by which
individual claims of immunity from state interference are raised, the
value of religious freedom is sometimes identified with that part of
the Amendment. Justice Clark in the Schempp case describes that
clause as guaranteeing "the value of religious training, teaching and
observance and, more particularly, the right of every persons to
freely choose his own course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion from the state." 90 Constitutionally speaking, such a defini,tion is too expansive for not every practice of religion will be tolerated by the state, and not every burden placed on religious preferences of the individual by state action is unconstitutional. Yet the
quote is representative of a natural tendency to identify the interest
of religious freedom in its fullest form with the words in the Amendment which most closely describe it.
This extra-constitutional value which is so described, however, may
be shaped and affected by the interpretation of the establishment
clause, for when the state is forbidden to act in certain ways regarding religion, the rights of those persons who choose to seek the implementation of state programs for their own religious purposes is
restricted. The compulsion of the state enters the picture through
the agency of the Court and creates obstacles to the right of every
CHURCH AND STATE 3 (Oaks ed. 1963). What of the possibility that the free
exercise clause may be considered subsidiary to the establishment clause?
90. 374 U.S. 203 at 222 (1963).
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person to free choice of his own course with reference to religion. The
parents of a particular school district, for example, are forbidden to
effectuate through the school board a program of prayers in public
schools attended by their children.
The words of the free exercise clause thus frequently symbolize
more than their limited constitutional meaning. They are employed
to designate the social ideal of maximizing the freedom of the individual to practice his religion as he will, as against the establishment
clause which prohibits certain institutional arrangements between
state and church (or groups of religious persons) which are put outside the realization of any group or individual.
The possibility of tension between the two parts of the religion
clause as thus viewed has not always been obvious to the Court. In
what Justice Rutledge called the first case calling for a square determination of the meaning of the establishment clause, 9 1 the Court
was impressed by the complementarity of the parts of the Amendment and quoted with approval an earlier judicial pronouncement
from South Carolina on the matter:
The structure of our government has, for the preservation
of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority. 9 2
At issue in the Everson case was the claim that New Jersey established religion when, by statute and township resolution, it authorized
the reimbursement of parents for moneys expended in transporting
their children to Catholic schools in public conveyances. Presumably
the Court could have articulated the reasons why such transportation was a public welfare service-the basic rationale-without attempting to embroider the opinion with definitive interpretation of
the First Amendment. Instead, Justice Black set forth the famous
paragraph which was so obviously dicta. 9 3 That dicta, of course, has
91.

Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 29 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
92. Id. at 15. The original citation of the statement came in Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1871), quoting from Harmon v. Dreher,
Speer's Equity Reports (S.C. 1843), 87, 120.
93. "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means
at least thhis: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go or remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or dlsbellefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
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become a constitutional formula around which much of the ensuing
controversies have swirled.
The gratuitous elaboration of such a broad gloss on the establishment clause might be justified on the ground that an initial statement
of overriding principle was necessary in an area preceptibly ripe for
litigation. Sub silento the Court was weaving the standard of the
establishment clause into the Fourteenth Amendment and thereby
exposing the church-state arrangements in every state to its coverage. Exposition of the available guides would, no doubt, be helpful.
Yet such an explanation of the Court's readiness to speak expansively
on the issue implies that the legal problems which were anticipated
were deemed relatively simple and definable. It is possible that the
Court underestimated the extreme complexity and sensitivity of the
church-state issue, but the presence of four dissenters in the Everson
case itself casts doubt on the proposition. A more persuasive explanation is that the Court accepted as an operating premise the rule of
thumb that the broader the interpretation given to each of the religion clauses, the greater the degree of religious freedom. Indeed,
Justice Black, noting the latitude given the free exercise clause in
earlier cases, explicitly states "there is every reason to give the same
application and broad interpretation to the 'establishment of religion
clause.' -94
The approach which crystallizes out of the reasoning of the
Everson majority would apparently inflate each of the Amendment's parts, seriatim, to the greatest size of which it is capable. In
emphasizing the complimentarity of the parts, the Court seems to
deny that there can be any root difficulties in accomodating each of
the values of the clauses. While the Amendment as so interpreted
deals with two different fears-one of governmental corruption of
religion, the other of exploitation of the state by religious groupsthe goal of each part is the same: the complete separation of government and religion. 9 5 Hence the Court easily resorts to Jefferson's
metaphor as a popular expression of the constitutional standard.
And with equal facility comes the boldness in the extensive enumerateach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the afflairs of any religious organizations or
groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect a wall of separation between church
and state." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
94. Everson, supra note 93 at 15.
95. For a critical examination of the view that the clauses are meant to
protect, respectively, freedom from religion and freedom for religion, see
Gorman, Toward a More Perfect Union, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND
STATE 42-50 (Oaks ed. 1963).
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tion of the things which government, whether federal or state, cannot do consistently with the First Amendment.
As against the premise of complementarity, however, the Court in
grappling with the facts of the New Jersey program before it quickly
discovers that the expansion of one part of the religion clause may be
the contraction of the other. Justice Black is plainly concerned that an
establishment ruling which would deny a state legislature the opportunity to provide for safe transportation of children to sectarian
schools would also represent an impediment to individual religious
freedom. He protests that welfare legislation need not exclued any
citizen because of his "faith or lack of it. ' ' P 6 Even the possibility that
state-financed bus transportation may swing the balance of parental
indecision on whether to utilize the sectarian school does not deter
the majority from its holding of constitutionality. An analogy is
drawn between the school bus program and other basic welfare services such as police and fire protection, which unquestionably contribute
to the readiness of individuals to exercise rights of affiliation and
participation in church activities.
Thus the Everson majority, prescinding from the broad outlines
drawn by the quote from the South Carolina court, finds itself perforce entoiled in apprehensions about the consequences for religious
liberty of a rule that a state is constitutionally forbidden to extend
social welfare benefits to citizens who have exercised that freedom.
At one point, the Court states that New Jersey "cannot exclude"
members of any religion or of no religion because of "their faith, or
lack of it." 9 7 The majority thus teeters on the edge of a conclusion
that the free exercise clause requires the state to make these benefits
available to all. But the Court immediately disclaims these implications by asserting that there is no constitutional obligation on the
part of a state to include students of sectarian schools in bus transportation programs
In retrospect the Everson opinion-may be seen as a microcosm of
the nagging dilemma which has plagued the Court in its development
of an adequate First Amendment philosophy. The inner conflicts of
interpretation displayed in Everson are not too far removed from the
paradox posed by the simultaneous decisions in Murray and Sherbert.
In its simplest expression, this dilemma consists in the attempt to
render the state completely isolated from religion at the same time
that the protection of religious liberty is maintained as a fundamental
postulate of the society. Put another way, the state is at the same
time struck blind to the factor of religious difference and commanded
to watch diligently to avoid infringement of religious freedom.
96.
97.

330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
Ibid.
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Justice Douglas, who appears marvelously vulnerable to the full
thrust of both of these ideas, has put the conflicting admonitions in
one formulation:
The First Amendment commands government to have no interest in theology or ritual; it admonishes government to be
interested in allowing religious freedom to flourish .... 98
How it is possible for government to maintain an interest in religious
freedom (much less allow it to flourish) without retaining some interest in theology or ritual (at least as a sociological fact), is not
immediately evident.
The pinch for the Supreme Court has come from the two pressures,
precisely at the point where the Court is most anxious to guard civil
rights and to satisfy the principle that "where First Amendment freedoms are or may be affected, government must employ those means
which will least inhibit the exercise of Constitutional liberties. . . ." 9 9
When the Court interprets the religious clauses, it speaks authoritatively as government and is bound by its principle to seek the means
of interpretation which least inhibits the several different liberties
encompassed by the Amendment. One writer has described these
several elements as follows:
... a proper Church-State relationship must be found to have
two aspects. One is the restrictive aspect of organic disconnection. The other is the permissive aspect of impartial
association with religious groups to achieve those ends which
the secular state and religion hold in common. 1 0 0
But how can both portions of the Amendment be shaped so that the
liberties represented by the other are not oppressed. What is one
man's organic connection between church and state may be another's
permissive and impartial association.
In the past two decades the Court has sougth to ennunciate the
relationship between these two elements primarily by an explanation
of what establishment means. Several distinct patterns of judicial
thinking have emerged in this effort to state the essence and scope
of the first 10 words of the Amendment. In form, if not in substance,
the doctrine of religious freedom has been at the mercy of the preoccupation with the need to state an acceptable rationale by which
98. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 564 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
99. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 265, n.29 (1963) (concurring
opinion).
100. Harding, Religious Liberty: the Source of Freedom? 11 Sw. L. J.
169, 182 (1957).
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state involvements with religion may be measured. An effort will now
be made to trace the significance of these major patterns of thought.
THE WALL OF SEPARATION
The first great effort to subsume the two values of the clause under
one orienting principle was made by Justice Wiley Rutledge, dissenting in Everson. In language that surely must rank as among the most
eloquent and moving in American jurisprudence, Rutledge took the
Jeffersonian metaphor of the wall of separation and apotheosized it.
For him the object of the Amendment was "to create a complete and
permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil
authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or
support for religion."' 01 In the practical order, the solution offered
was the subordination of the free exercise clause and the individual
liberty which it connotes to the establishment clause.
Rutledge built his First Amendment doctrine on several adamant
convictions which have maintained a hold on subsequent judicial
thinking, though not in the same compelling way as for their originator. The first of these was the uncritical identification of the legislative history of the First Amendment with the ideological views of
James Madison. The religion clauses became "the refined product
0
and the terse summation" of the history of Madison and Virginia.' 2
This attitude implied not merely a recognition of the influence and
leadership of Madison, who chaired the committee reporting the First
Amendment. A further demand was the complete subservience of all
surrounding circumstances to an investigation of the thought, opinions, and actions of the famous libertarian. The fact that five years
elapsed from the passage of the Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom to the ratification of the First Amendment did not
disturb the Rutledge vision of the religion clauses as a careful repetition by Madison for the nation of what he had done for his state. The
existence of religious establishments in other states, whose delegates
were also present in the Congress and backers of the Amendment, did
not give any pause to the conclusion that Madison personified its
meaning. The full vigor of the dissenting argument in Everson is
brought to bear on the proposition that history is ineluctably clear on
the matter, and its clarity is a function of the Madisonian mind.' 0 3
101.

Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947)

102.

Id. at 33.

(dissenting opin-

ion).
103. The guarantees of the Amendment are those which "he (Madison)
put in." Id. at 31. "Madison could not have confused 'church' and 'religion' . ... "
Ibid. The Remonstrance is appended by Justice Rutledge so that readers will
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A necessary corollary to this equation of the constitutional standard with the thought of one man was the telescoping of American
history and political change. The First Amendment not only translated originally as what Madison wanted, but its meaning for New
Jersey in the 20th century could conveniently be found by rummaging
around in Madison's papers. The traumatic changes wrought in the
structure of the American polity by the Civil War and Fourteenth
Amendment, for example, left the purpose and function of the religious clauses untouched and exactly comprehensible. Rutledge displayed no hesitancy in answering the questions shaped by contemporary social and economic pressures out of the mouth of an 18th
century man who was concerned with the issues of a quite different
world. The simplistic and anachronistic hope was indulged, not only
that history would provide the final answer for this year's controversy, but that the past would favor men with the uncommon foresight of employing their language, sentiments, and prejudices so the
message would come through clearly.
The answer which history so unequivocally provided for Rutledge
in the Everson case was that "any appropriation, large or small, from
public funds to aid or support any and all religious exercises" is forbidden.104 The words are similar to those framing the principles
announced by the Everson majority, but the meaning is somewhat
different. For what Rutledge meant by "religious exercises" was,
apparently, any and all human concerns that arise in, or channel to,
religious beliefs or practices. Hence, the majority's argument that
bus transportation is a public service was met by the assertion that
the only vital element in the case is "the religious factor and its
essential connection with the transportation." 10 5 It is not the amount
of money expended, or why, but the principle of separate spheres for
church and state, which is determinative.
The separationist construct of Rutledge is calculatedly rigid and
unyielding. Compared with the vacillation and hesitancy of some
other Justices on the Court regarding the historical meaning and
concrete application of the religious clauses, the Rutledge dissent
stands uncluttered and confident. (This may explain, in part, why
from time to time a judge refers to it with longing envy while refusnot "lose sight of what he and his coworkers had in mind...."
Id. at 38.
"Madison was certain in his own mind" the First Amendment was not needed,
Id. at 38, but when he arrived at the First Congress, "he went at once about
performing his pledge to establish freedom for the nation as he had done in
Virginia." Id. at 39.
104. Id. at 41.
105.

Id. at 50.
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ing to follow its logic.) Where others might give the appearance of a
startled recognition that the magnification of the establishment ban
for one group has consequences for the religious freedom of others,
Rutledge explicitly acknowledges the problem and deliberately makes
his value judgment.
Like St. Paul's freedom, religious liberty with a great price
must be bought. And for those who exercise it most fully, by
insisting upon religious education for their children mixed
with secular, by the terms of our Constitution the price is
06
greater than for others.'
Rutledge's willingness to sacrifice the exercise of religion as a
hostage to the establishment clause was not a sterile and negative act.
For him, the denial of a welfare aid because of the religious factor was
necessary to assure a more comprehensive religious freedom. The
ultimate value which he sought to protect is expressed in the faith
that "complete separation between the state and religion is best for
the state and best for religion."' 1 07 The First Amendment was something like a peace treaty in which each power, civil and sacred, covenanted to leave the other one alone. This meant that the two clauses
"were correlative and coextensive ideas, representing only different
facets of the single great and fundamental freedom."' 0 8
Except for one area, the Everson dissenter would reconcile all
discordancies between the two parts of the First Amendment-between the bar on institutional links and the guarantee of individual
freedom-in favor of complete separation. He candidly admitted such
a view would impose hardships on the individual who follows his
religious imperatives when he stated "Now as when it was adopted
the price of religious freedom is double. It is that the church and
religion shall live both within and upon that freedom."' 1 0 9 His only
concession to the circumstance that churches and other religious
groups must seek their goals within the legal structure of the society
relates to fire and police protection, and access to public highways.
The explanation offered for these deviations from the logic of his
approach is the comment that these protections do not require funds
to be earmarked for religious instructions or uses. I10 But a distinction along these lines seems subject to the same objection that Rutledge made to the attempt to sift out the state money spent on trans106.

Id. at 59.

107.

Id. at 59.

108.

Id. at 40.

109.

Id. at 53.

110.

Id.

at 61, n.56.
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portation in the Everson case and segregate it from the cost of operating the sectarian schools. Some part of the public money spent on
fire fighting equipment and personnel is allocable to protection of
church properties, and certainly the maintenance of the property is
an essential part of the religious purpose of the congregation. The
admixture of the secular and religious beneficiaries of the tax monies
used for police protection would seem indistinguishable from the
Everson situation.' 11 That this concession represents the full extent
of the allowance for free exercise accommodation is suggested by the
doubts expressed about the constitutionality of tax exemption of
religious property.
The character of the Rutledge dissent is perhaps best described by
its inability to see that the wall which Jefferson mentioned was metaphorical. Of all the writing in the church-state field, this opinion by
its naivete may have performed the worst service. The power with
which it was uttered forced other members of the Court to make an
obeisance to its existence in future decisions. One suspects that the
task of seeing the First Amendment in its entirely received an indefinite postponement as one consequence. The very next year, in deciding
the case of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,,1 2 the
majority wrote a wooden and unenlightening opinion in condemnation
of a released time program of religious instruction classes held on
public school premises. Relying exclusively on the comprehensive
statement of establishment principles, dropped as dicta in the Everson
case, the Court employed a syllogistic approach in which the minor
premise described the use of a tax-supported school system and buildings, and the compulsory schools laws, as aid to religion. The fleshing
out of this skeleton of reason was left to the commentators, and to
the concurring opinions. The sensitivity displayed in the Everson case
concerning the effect of a finding of establishment on claims of free
exercise of religion was completely missing, though the Court explained that the holding did not manifest hostility to religion.' 13
Even the free exercise claims of the non-participating children of the
Champaign school system were left unexamined. With Justice Rutledge concurring, the majority summed up their reasoning with the
wall of separation metaphor, and the flaccid generality:
For the First Amendment rests upon the premise that both
religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty
111. That this concession represented the full extent of the allowance for
religious freedom is suggested by the doubts he implicitly conveyed on the
constitutionality of tax exemption of religious property. Id. at 61, N. 56.
112. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
113. Id. at 211, 112.

1964]

THE ESTABLISHMENT SYNDROME

aims if each is left free from the other within its respective
sphere.' 14
Time and the entanglements of precedent, to which Rutledge referred,1 5 have shown the inadequacies of the strict separationist
formula. The variety of church-state problems which have appeared
in the years since Everson have proved too complex for the one-edged
instrument which Rutledge forged. His simple faith in the certainties
of history has given way to a growing skepticism in these matters.
Justice Douglas has himself admitted that to authorize prayer in a
public school is not "to establish a religion in the strictly historic
meaning of those words." ' 1 6 Justice Brennan among others has confessed the murky ambiguities of history, referring to the dispute
among scholars over whether Jefferson and Madison would have condemned devotional exercises in the public schools if they had known
1
the complex of factors which characterize their role in modern life.'
The utility and advantages of the "wall of separation" as a tool of
analysis has likewise been subjected to an eroding scrutiny. The
elusiveness of the line between the secular and sectarian in American
life has been noted. ' 1 8 In a rather startling statement only four years
after the Everson decision, the Court said through Justice Douglas:
"The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all
respects there shall be a separation of Church and State." 1 1 9 The
metaphor has been called by a commentator "at best a title for an
idea. It suggests a disposition, or several dispositions which vary in
114. Id. at 212. Even the dissenter, Justice Reed, ignored what seems in
retrospect to be a tenable framework for his argument; the interests of religious
freedom represented by those using the Champaign program. Instead the dissenter relied on the numerous instances of church-state accomodation in United
States history as expressive of a tradition under which this kind of involvement
was permitted.
115. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947) (dissenting opinion):
"The matter is not one of quantity, to be measured by the amount of money
expended. Now as in Madison's day it is one of principle, to keep separate the
separate spheres as the First Amendment drew them; to prevent the first
experiment upon our liberties; and to keep the question from becoming entangled
in corrosive precedents."
116. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 442 (1962) (concurring opinion).
117. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1963) (concurring
opinion). "A too literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers upon the
issues of these cases seems to me futile and misdirected for several reasons:
First, on our precise problem the historical record is at best ambiguous, and
statements can readily be found to support either side of the proposition ..
Id. at 237.
118. Id. at 231 (concurring opinion).
119.

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
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their emphasis on what should fall within the pale of separation and
what should not."120 The coup de grace may have been delivered by
an intellectual iconoclast for whom the future of this wall seems
2
bleak.1
It is doubtful whether any of the present members of the Court
would fully accept the Rutledge approach and its concomitant burden
on the individual's religious freedom. Yet traces of the philosophy
appear unmistakably in some of the opinions. Moreover, in a broad
sense, the continued efforts of the Court to break through the confusion of doctrine surrounding the religious clauses has borne the
marks of the separationist view by their emphasis on the meaning of
establishment as the device for illumination. If few have been willing
to accept the full implications of the Rutledge conclusion that free
exercise must be subordinated to the disestablishment theme, the
reconciliation of the dual prohibitions on government has been most
often sought through an exposition of that latter idea.
The relevance of Madison to the interpretation of the Amendment
cannot be disputed, of course, but one mark of the separationist influence continues to manifest itself in an extravagant personalization
of the Amendment. Justice Warren exemplified this tendency recently
by relying on the fact that Madison presented a "bill for punishing
...sabbath breakers" into the Virginia legislature as evidence that
contemporary Sunday closing laws did not represent an establishment.12 2 Undoubtedly the employment of this type of historical data
can be defended as an aid to interpretation, but the whole tone of the
Court's reliance on Madison strikes some ears as a form of heroworship. The exaggeration may be permitted, to make the point, that
the Court often gives the impression that the measure of meaning in
the First Amendment is what James Madison would have done if he
had thought of a particular problem.
Since it is doubtful that the citation of biographical history often
truly controls or determines a constitutional decision in this area, the
form of opinions may be overlooked. But echoes of strict separationist
120. Dusenberg, Jurisdiction of Civil Courts over Religious Issues, 20 OHIO
ST. L.J. 508, 509 (1959).
121.

Hutchins, The Future of the Wall, in

THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH

AND STATE 19 (Oaks ed. 1963): "The wall has done what walls usually do:
it has obscured the view. It has lent a simplistic air to the discussion of a
very complicated matter. Hence it has caused confusion whenever it has been
invoked. Far from helping to decide cases, it has made opinions and decisions
unintelligible. The wall is offered as a reason. It is not a reason; it is a figure
of speech."
122. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 438-39 (1961).
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philosophy occasionally seem to constitute the whole tune of a decision. An instance in point is Justice Douglas' dissent, in the Sunday
closing law cases, on the issue of establishment. 1 2 3 One reading of
that opinion would indicate that his objection is not solely that the
alleged secular purposes of such Blue Laws are fictitious, but that
these secular purposes (admittedly legitimate) are somehow contaminated by their association with motives of religious convenience
for the majority of the population. In one sense his characterization
of the challenged legislation is more incisive than that of the majority, because he clearly recognizes that the choice of Sunday for the
common day of rest is dictated by religious considerations. His conclusion seems to be that Sunday is therefore disqualified as the choice
of the state to achieve an admitted secular purpose. Accepted at its
full value, the opinion would take outside the realm of legislative
competence any area of human conduct which has significant religious
associations. 12 4 Just as bus transportation was religion for Rutledge
because the terminal point of the trip was a religious school, so tranquility and quiet are religion for Douglas because the occasion will
be employed by a substantial number for prayer. Perhaps the attribution of such a meaning to the Justice's words is extreme, but these
implications of the opinion are not negatived by such comments as:
On argument, there was much made over the desirability of
fixing a single day for rest, either on grounds of administrative convenience or on grounds of the need for leisure. In
light of the history and meaning of the shared leisure of
12 5
Sunday, this aim still has religious overtones.
This is separation with a vengeance, if the presence of religious overtones makes a potential object of legislation subject to the curse of
establishment. One wonders how Justice Douglas would deal with the
social chaos that could arise should the state locate one day of the
week sacred to no religious group and demand that the day of commercial rest be taken then. Such a choice would arguably interfere
with the free exercise rights of every religious group in the community. Just as the Sabbatarians in the Sunday closing cases suffered
measurable economic burdens, so under the hypothetical an economic
penalty would be imposed on all religious persons whose faith de123.

Id. at 561 (dissenting opinion).
124. "There is an 'establishment' of religion in the constitutional sense
if any practice of any religious group has the sanction of law behind it. There
is an interference with the 'free exercise' of religion if what in conscience one
can do or omit doing is required because of the religious scruples of the
community." Id. at 576-77. Such a statement could take outside of iegislative
competence, inter alia, murder, polygamy, and suttee.
125. Id. at 576, n.7 (dissenting opinion).
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manded that some other day be observed for worship. The factor of
religion would then be the basis for the deliberate legislative action
disfavoring believers; to avoid establishment in the sense of complete
separation, the societal structure would be turned on its head. If the
position were taken that the legislative choice of the hypothetical
non-religious day was justified by secular purpose, the resulting burdens (of a constitutional magnitude or not) would fall only on
religiously-oriented persons. Would such a holding imply that discrimination in the First Amendment sense covers only formal religious bodies, that is, that irreligion may be preferred to religion?
On the other hand, if the conclusion were reached (as the dissenters
in the Sunday closing cases argue) that such a burden is unconstitutional because of its interference with religious freedom, the complete
separationist would be left with the unrealistic conclusion that government is incapable of acting even for genuine secular purposes if
religion is in any way involved.
The flavor of the Rutledge balancing of the two portions of the
First Amendment appears in still other contexts. The concurring
opinion in the Engel case, where the New York Regents Prayer in
public schools was condemned as an establishment, again reveals Justice Douglas brewing a succession of tempests in a widely diversified
set of teapots. With one footnote, the whole range of links between
religion and the state is canvassed and apparently condemned as representing the financing of religion. 1 26 Justice Stewart in dissent
referred somewhat unbelievingly to this reduction of the legal issue
of Engel to one strictly of government finance, and pointed out that
military and prison chaplains are paid by government.12 7 His clear
implication is that such arrangements are not unconstitutional.
Whether they are or not under a strict separationist approach would
seem entirely debatable, particularly with Justice Douglas' reference
again to the Rutledge standard of a "double price for religious freedom," cited in its entirety. 128
Where the wall philosophy has not reappeared in the form of decisional judgments or analytical constructs, it occasionally provides
the background and inspiration for extravagant excurions into the
legislative purpose of the First Amendment. The majority opinion in
the Engel case cites not one precedent in support of its conclusion
126. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437, n.1 (concurring opinion. "Our system
at the federal and state levels is presently honeycombed with such financing.
Nevertheless, I think it is an unconstitutional undertaking whatever form it
takes."
127.

Id. at 449, n. 4 (dissenting opinion).

128.

Id. at 443-44.
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that a 22-word non-denominational prayer led by the public school
teacher before morning classes is an establishment. 1 2 9 Rather than
rely on precedent, a far-ranging analysis of English history is harnessed to citations from Madison's Remonstrance to raise specters of
religious persecutions and the perversion of sacred things. Without
challenging most of the ideological content which the Court finds in
the establishment clause, a reader may still admit that the opinion
hardly sheds a crack of light on the contemporary function of the
Amendment. To say that the clause forbade a union of government
and religion, that it reflected a conception of religion as too personal
and sacred to risk perversion by the civil magistrate, that it expressed
the concern that religious persecutions follows establishment-these
still leave hanging the determination of what destroys government
and what degrades religion. The imaginative student may here provide his own particularized reasons as to why the prayer must be excluded from the school. The Court's function is discharged when it
rings some familiar sounds upon the bell of complete separation. Except for those with Justice Rutledge's passion to rive the two cities
apart no matter what the cost, there is a certain incongruity in Justice Black's association of the anemic prayer described in the case
with the "anguish, hardship, and bitter strife that could come when
zealous religious groups struggled with one another to obtain the
Government's stamp of approval from each King, Queen, or Protector that came to temporary power."' 1 3 0 This is not to say that the
prayer is permissible or constitutional. The conclusion rather is that
such a question is buried under the rhetoric of the Court. And not the
least difficulty with fixations on camel's noses and first experiments
with liberty is the intellectual chaos which they inflict on serious
efforts to formulate a viable public policy which recognizes that there
has to be a successful co-existence of the two forces.
THE COERCIVE ELEMENT IN ESTABLISHMENT
An established church in the historical sense was one which had the
preferment of the government. 1 3 1 The restriction of the words of
129. A reference to Everson in note 11, 370 U.S. 421, 428, is solely for
the purpose of indicating that the history surrounding the fight for religious
freedom in Virginia is set out there. In Schempp, Justice Clark explained that
the principles which were determinative in Engel were so "universally recognized" that no precedent needed to be cited. 374 U.S. 203, 220-21 (1963). For
another explanation, see Kauper, Prayer in the Public Schools, 61 MIcH. L. REV.
1031, 1048-49 (1963).
130. 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962).
131.

As Joseph Story expressed it

in his COMMENTARIES,

Vol. II,

§§1874,

1877: "An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy
to hold all in utter indifference would have created a universal disapprobation,
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the First Amendment to such a concept would not in itself free the
application of the religious clauses from difficulty. For while some
marks of establishment in this sense are readily detected, a point
would soon be reached where the line-drawing of legal definition would
experience difficulty. The focal question to be answered would be
whether or not the challenged state action favored a particular religious denomination. Moreover, the demarcation between what established and what infringed the free exercise of religion would not separate mutually exclusive effects. For often what would help to preserve the establishment, such as punishment of nonconformists,
would at the same time infringe individual liberty. Nonetheless, a
certain symmetry of coverage would emerge from such a conception
of the religious clauses: all sects would be protected from disadvantage under the first part of the clause, and all individuals would be
protected from state coercion regarding religion under the second.
Whatever the merits of the arguments for such a reading, the
Everson and McCollum cases expressed a view that establishment
means something more than mere preference. 1 3 2 If for no other
reason, the word "respecting" has seemed to the court to intimate a
broader prohibition of associations between religion and the state
than the historical meaning conveyed. 1 3 3 One consequence of this
decision, however, is to make the expression of a standard for determining establishment excruciatingly difficult. How much more than
preferment does non-establishment cover in the relationships between
church and state? The separationist view, mentioned in the previous
section, seems to start with the rule that all ties between the two are
severed and then make incidental qualifications to this according to
an unarticulated and perhaps indefinable measure. Justice Rutledge
stopped short of denying police and fire protection to churches, but
on grounds that are difficult to rationalize. Ample room exists under
this method to rely on the "prepossessions" which Justice Jackson
34
frankly confessed to operate.'
if not universal indignation . . . The real object of the Amendment was to
exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of
the national government."
132. See note 84, supra.
133. "But, the First Amendment, in Its final form, did not simply bar a
congressional enactment establishing a church; it forbade all laws res)pecting
an establishment of religion." (Italics in original). McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 441-42 (1961).
134. "It is idle to pretend that this task is one for which we can find
in the Constitution one word to help us as judges to decide where the secular
ends and the sectarian begins in education. Nor can we find guidance in any
other legal source. It is a matter on which we can find no law but our own
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Implicit in the separationist principle is the need to draw the line
somewhere, however, for common sense dictates that the state cannot allow churchmen to operate outside the boundaries of its control
and, contrariwise, the churches cannot be expected to provide their
own sewage systems. Churches are recognizable social organisms of
religion which must share in the common conditions of society, and
so in one sense they are "aided" by the state in a multitude of common ways; they and their agents use the currency, the streets, and
the sanitary facilities. By the nature of church activities, moreover,
individuals are influenced and shaped in ways that have consequences
for the operation and extension of the state. Each of these forms of
human association trench upon areas that potentially are inhabitable
by the other, and "no constitutional command which leaves religion
free can avoid this quality of interplay." 1 3 5 If the interplay were not
observable, one would begin to suspect that religion were not free.
Just such suspicions and fears of hostility to religion by the state
in the wake of the absolutism of the separation principle are apparent in the Zorach v. Clauson case, which rejected the claim that a
released time program of religious instruction off the premises of the
public school is an establishment. While the only explicit reference to
the free exercise clause by Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
took the form of rejecting a contention that the non-participating
plaintiff was being pressured into taking the religious instructions,
the majority obviously had in mind the disadvantage imposed on private religious activity if the school could not accommodate its schedule
to such a program. The Court expresses concern that the state and
religion may be "aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even
unfriendly."13 6 The Zorach program is compared to the situation
of a Protestant, Jew or Catholic child seeking permission to be absent
from school to attend a religious service. Even though the state
teacher may require confirmance of the fact of attendance at the
service, the Court cannot conclude that this is impermissible. Rather
the state through its agent is here merely making it possible for the
student to participate if he wishes, and this permissiveness is desirable. To the Court's mind, a contrary attitude would represent a
preference of those who believe in no religion to those who are believers. Public institutions are allowed under the ruling to adjust
13 7
their schedules "to accommodate the religious needs of the people."
prepossessions." Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203,
237-38 (1948) (concurring opinion).
135. Justice Frankfurter in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 462
(1961) (concurring opinion).
136. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
137. Id. at 315.
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It will be observed that the Court in Zorach is enmeshed in the same
kind of apprehension that characterized its treatment of the Everson
facts. In neither instance can the plaintiff make a free exercise complaint, because no infringement of his religious freedom had occurred. 1 3 8 Nevertheless the substantive issue to be decided by way of
the establishment clause was seen to have significance for the religious freedom of those children and parents who wanted to participate
in the instructional program. Viewed in this perspective, the program
would not be considered constitutionally necessary; rather the point
would be that if the Court held the state powerless to institute such a
program, that conclusion of establishment would itself be an impediment to the free exercise of religion.
Zorach can hardly be said to comply vith the strict separation view
and moreover, posed a serious problem of harmonization with the
McCollum decision. 13 9 For the dissenters who were unwilling to levy
the charge for religious freedom which Rutledge quite frankly did,
it became necessary to explain why-other than the fact that a religious element was found in the problem-the released time programs were offensive to the establishment clause.
The majority opinion in McCollum had been less than illuminating
on the precise grounds for the constitutional disqualification of the
Champaign program. The Court there had noted the use of taxsupported property and the cooperation between school authorities
and religious leaders; it had also referred to the fact that a compulsory education system helped to provide pupils for the religion
classes. The embracing implications of the wall metaphor would
cover both McCollum and the slightly different arrangement that was
present in Zorach. But the dissenters in the latter case now sought
to define more precisely what features of these arrangements ren138. In Zorach, plaintiff tried to raise the free exercise claim and the
New York court refused a trial on that issue. Justice Douglas for the majority thought the only allegation on the matter-in the complaint were
worse than "conclusory" because they did not implicate the School authorities in the charge of coercion. He concluded "It takes obtuse reasoning
to inject any Issue of the 'free exercise' of religion into the present case."
343 U.S. 306, 311 (1952). The dissenters, however, thought that an opportunity be
given plaintiff to support his claim with evidence. 343 U.S. 306, 322 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J.) In Schempp, Justice Brennan concludes that the free exercise
claim does not serve to distinguish McCollum and Zorach but remarks that he recognizes there is a question of proof in the latter. 374 U.S. 203, 261, n. 27 (concurring).
139. The author of Zorach, Justice Douglas, reconciled that decision with
McCollum by reference to the fact that public classrooms were not used and hence
no public funds were expended. Expenditure of funds, even in the smallest of
amounts, has been the focal point of the Justice's approach to establishment
problems, note 126 supra.
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dered the programs offensive to the establishment concept. The new
note that appears is an emphasis on the coercive features of the
plans.
Justice Frankfurter had already anticipated and relied on this
element in his concurring opinion in the McCollum case. While placing his ultimate holding on the broader ground of "fusion of Government and of religious sects," 1 4 0 and notions of complete separation,
he had also conceded that "we are dealing not with a full-blown
principle nor one having the definiteness of a surveyor's metes and
bounds."141 As part of an historical summarization of the place of
religion in the public schools, he had further recognized that the released time idea in some sense represented a manifestation of the free
exercise of religion. 1 4 2 It therefore became necessary to study the
operation of the specific program before the Court and to isolate the
features of it which rendered it objectionable. Two effects which the
Justice deemed coercive in character are specifically noted, the "obvious pressure upon children to attend" these religious classes, and
the "feeling of separatism" engendered in those children belonging to
sects which do not participate in the program. 1 4 3 That these consequences are not statistically verifiable does not make them irrelevant in Justice Frankfurter's mind. Together they help to give content to his judgment that the Champaign program leads to the "consequences against which the Constitution was directed."' 4 4
All three of the dissenting opinions in Zorach pick up this characterization of inherent pressure and develop it in various ways. 1 4 5
Justice Black, the author of McCollum, proceeds to expand on this
rationale by emphasizing that released time programs employ the
state's educational machinery to channel students to religious in140.
llinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948)
(concurring opinion).
141.

Id. at 217.

142. Id. at 225. "Insofar as these (released time classes) are manifestations
merely of the free exercise of religion, they are quite outside the scope of judicial
concern, except insofar as the Court may be called upon to protect the right of
religious freedom."
143. Id. at 227-28.
144.

Id. at 228.

145. The McCollum decision is frequently characterized in subsequent opinions as being based on coercion, though the majority opinion in that case made
no special point of that element. When Justice Warren refers to the McCollum
case in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 452 (1961), he would seem to be
describing the concurring opinion rather than the majority: "The Court found
that this system had the effect of coercing the children to attend religious
classes. .. "
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struction. The shadowy outlines of separation of church and state
are now drawn sharply into a picture of state coercion:
Here the sole question, is whether New York can use its
compulsory education laws to help religious sects get attendants presumably too unenthusiastic to go unless moved to do
so by the pressure of this state machinery. That this is the
plan, purpose, design and consequence of the New York
program cannot be denied. The state thus makes religious
sects beneficiaries of its power to compel children to attend
secular schools. Any use of such coercive power by the state
to help or hinder some religious sects or to prefer all religious sects over nonbelievers or vice versa is just what I
14
think the First Amendment forbids. 6
Justice Frankfurter concentrates his attention on the putative
coercion exercised against those students who chose not to participate in the program and hence are kept in school classrooms during
that time. What the plaintiffs had raised as an issue of "free exercise" Frankfurter now transmutes into an element of the establishment basis upon which he rests his conclusion of unconstitutionality.147 Justice Jackson includes both the participating students
and those remaining in the school room as objects of the coercion and
characterizes the underlying reason for the invalidity of the McCollum program as state compulsion too.
While these analyses of possible coercive features in an establishment claim may help to demonstrate on otherwise unbridled principle
of separation of church and state, they simultaneously create difficulties in maintaining a tenable balance between the two clauses of
the Amendment. For what is to distinguish an establishment from
an infringement of free exercise of religion, if both are judged by the
coercion exercised on an individual? As noted above, the very existence of an establishment in the historic sense almost invariably imposed burdens of one sort or another upon members of the society, so
that what established usually infringed free exercise of religion.14 8
Yet there was a distinguishing mark between the two prohibitions
which, while it would not prevent overlaps, would help to keep the
concepts analytically distinct. An establishment was marked by favoritism to a sect, irrespective of whether this was accompanied by
coercion on the individual. State action which did not represent such
146.

343 U.S. 306, 318 (1952).

147. Note 138, supra.
148. If this were not so, there would hardly be any need for an establishment, which only becomes meaningful if some given number of citizens refuse
to follow (or potentially are dissenters from) an accepted orthodoxy.
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preference for a particular church could nevertheless directly or
indirectly infringe free exercise.
Once preference is eliminated as the standard, however, there does
not appear to be any convincing way by which the two clauses of the
Amendment can be distinguished on the basis of coercion alone.
Obviously the Justices in Zorach were not maintaining that you could
never have an establishment except when you could show the type of
personal burden on religion which would also support a free exercise
claim. The plaintiff had raised the free exercise issue, and it would
have been a simple matter to premise the disagreement with the majority upon that element. What seems more likely is that the dissenters were suggesting that there are certain typs of involvements
where the effort to maintain a difference between the two clauses is
unimportant, and narrow conceptions of state compulsion must give
way to a comprehensive philosophy of church-state not bound in any
confining way to the exact words of the Amendment. This would
imply, however, that the notion of coercion to describe these proscribed involvements is being used in a special and not very helpful
sense.
That the temptation is sometimes irrestible to merge the two
clauses in one undifferentiated lump for purposes of decision is confirmed by the case of Torcaso v. Watkins.1 4 9 A provision of the
Maryland constitution required that holders of state offices make a
declaration of belief in God. Justice Black for a unanimous Court
struck down the requirement under the First Amendment without
finding it necessary to clarify which of the portions of the religious
clause was controlling. On one hand the Everson paragraph with its
ban on a state forcing a person to profess a belief in any religion was
cited as controlling over what is presumably an establishment issue.
On the other hand, the last few paragraphs of the decision center on
the impact of the requirement on the individual notary public who
was plaintiff, concluding that there is an invasion of his "freedom of
belief and religion."1 5 0 The result is surely as uncontroversial as
can be imagined in the church-state field. The failure to state a
specific part of the Amendment as ground of decision may be dismissed as unimportant, since the state had obviously acted in a way
which had a direct effect upon the individual's religious freedom by
conditioning access to a state office on acceptance of a deity.
But there are several difficulties in an approach which indiscriminately fuses the two parts of the Amendment under a common denominator of coercion. A practical problem is the question of stand149.

367 U.S. 488 (1962).

150.

Id. at 496.
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ing, for if there are coercive features in whatever governmental action qualifies as establishment then the pleading itself, if it is sufficiently meritorious to state a claim for relief, must entitle the plaintiff to be heard on the issue of free exercise as well.' 5 1 The Court in
the Sunday closing law cases was unwilling to go this far, however,
despite the fact that the allegations of the appellants were that the
purpose of the prohibition of work was to induce people to join
3
Christian sects' 5 2 and encourage Christian religion worship.15 It
is not perceived why the mere fact that the plaintiffs were able to
resist these alleged pressures would deny them the opporunity to contend they infringed their religious liberty. Yet even Frankfurter himself agreed that such parties had no standing to assert the free
exercise clause because, he said, they had not alleged infringement of
their own rights of conscience. ' 5 4 There thus appears to be instances
of state involvement with religion which might constitute establishment and yet not entitle certain persons within the ambit of that
involvement to be heard on a free exercise claim unless they specifically and publicly allege that their religious views are different than
those being favored by the state. The burdens imposed on free exercise are at least in some instance distinguishable from the effects
created by the establishment.
A more serious difficulty with the standard of coercion as a touchstone for all church-state problems is that it blurs some important
distinctions in analysis and provides a chameleonic word to justify
conclusions. When Justice Black spoke of the participating students
in the Zorach released program as being pressured into attending the
lessons, he surely oversimplified what is a complex of problems. 1 66
151. Analyses of the distinction between the two clauses as it affects standing are contained in Moore, supra note 147; Kurland, The School Prayer Cases, in
THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 174-48 (Oaks ed. 1963). See also Kauper,
Prayer in the Public Schools, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1031, 1056 (1963).

152. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431 (1961): "The essence of
appellants' 'establishment' argument is that Sunday is the Sabbath day of the
predominant Christian sects; that the purpose of the enforced stoppage of labor
on that day is to facilitate and encourage church attendance; that the purpose
of setting Sunday as a day of universal rest is to induce people with no religion
or people with marginal religious beliefs to join the predominant Christian sects;
that the purpose of the atmosphere of tranquility created by Sunday closing is to
aid the conduct of church services and religious observance of the sacred day."
153. Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 592 (1961).
154. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 468, n. 6 (1961) (concurring
opinion).
155. 343 U.S. 306, 318 (1952) (dissenting opinion) : "Here the sole question
is whether New York can use its compulsory education laws to help religious sects
get attendants presumably too unenthusiastic to go unless moved to do so by
the pressure of this state machinery."
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Some children in the group to which he referred may have been unenthusiastic about their attendance while their parents were determined that they make every lesson in the program. Children are not
often enthusiastic about any form of study, and to speak of the state
compelling them to a religious observance when it complies with
parental decision is not a particularly helpful analysis. Other children
whose parents are indifferent to the released time plan may be influenced by the participation of their classmates. The state is hardly
responsible for this kind of childish imitation, but it does provide the
occasion by its cooperation with the religious authorities for its
operation. Another group of children may express parental decision
by refusing to enter any such instructional program, choosing instead
to remain in school. The social pressures which greet such a nonconformist may indeed be great. 1 5 6 Conceivably his freedom (or that
of his parent, depending on where the critical choice is lodged) has
been infringed by the state's participation in the program which permits these pressures. But the appropriate vehicle for testing such
claims initially would seem to be the free exercise clause. 1 57 At
least it is not clear that the mere possibility of such an influence,
working with what unknown effect, and without regard for the particular precautions built into the program, produces any substantial
or material effect on religious choice.
That the Court will not pursue to the limit such speculative estimates of the coercive aspects of state programs as the defining char156. Justice Brennan points out some of the available studies on the question of peer-group pressure on individuals refusing to follow the path of the
majority in School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 290 n. 69 (1963) (concurring
opinion). For an excellent presentation of the position that religious programs
in the public schools exert indirect coercive effects, see Choper, Religion in the
Public Schools: A Proposed ConstitutionalStandard, 47 MINN. L. REV. 329, 343-50
(1963). The authors do not face the question of what religious effects are produced
by deliberate state decision to exclude these programs from public schools. Compare the view of Ball, The School Prayer Case, 8 CATH. LAW. 182 (1962), and
The Forbidden Prayer, THE COMMONWEAL, July 27, 1962.

157. The Court has bypassed the free exercise claim in favor of decisions
based on establishment in several instances McCollum and Zorach could be considered as raising free exercise questions, supra note 138 supra. In Schempp,
Justice Brennan concluded that the excusal provision of the Bible-reading program necessarily operates in a way to violate free exercise. His reasoning is that
the child is being called upon to profess publicly the fact of its disbelief as the
price of being excused from the exercise. An analogy is drawn to Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, holding that the conditioning of a tax exemption upon the
aflirmation of loyalty to government was unconstitutional since it threatened to
deter persons from constitutionally-protected activities which might raise questions of loyalty, since the taxpayer has the burden of proving his innocence. 374
U.S. 203 at 288-293 (1963). Would it be permissible to set up the program so as
to require those who wanted to participate to make their wishes known?
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acteristic of violations of the establishment clause is evident in the
case of McGowan v. Maryland. The establishment claim was made
there by seven employees of a discount house who were convicted and
fined for selling on Sunday in Maryland. In rejecting the argument, the
Court concluded that the statutes' "present purpose and effect is not
to aid religion but to set aside a day of rest and recreation."' 58 The
Court's opinion is replete with argument concerning the historical
indicia of purpose, but one would be hard put to say on what grounds
the Court could determine the effect of these laws in terms of the
influences created on religious choice. One may doubt that the atmosphere and living patterns preserved and maintained by such laws
have been completly divorced from individual decisions to adopt a
form of Christianity, or to individual practice of Sunday churchgoing. Little doubt exists that Sunday was selected as the day of
rest precisely for the reason that a majority of persons considered
that day holy. If the presence of any minimum social compulsion on
religious practices in the framework of state-sponsored regulation is
the hallmark of establishment, the Court in McGowan should have
condemned the arrangement. Justice Warren in that case did refer
to the argument based on coercion in his attempt to distinguish the
McCoUum case, which through the alluvial accretions of time was
now summarized as a situation where the "system had the effect of
coercing the children to attend religious classes."'1 5 9 Of more importance for the present discussion, Warren then concluded "no such
coercion to attend church services is present in the situation at
bar." 16 0 There is no need to argue the merits of a distinction between
McCollum and McGowan based on the degree of religious influence
exerted by the respective state involvements, to assert that the difference is only one of degree. The validity of the statement that there
is "no such coercion to attend church services" may be as debatable
in the Blue Law cases, as was the dissenter's assertion that coercion
existed in the released time programs of Zorach.
It is true, of course, that the majority in McGowan found that a
secular purpose had intruded itself into the state involvement with
Sunday closings. Thus the modern statutes were distinguished from
earlier laws which had specifically set forth a goal of inducing observance of the Lord's Day. Even when church attendance was not
compelled under these prior statutes, the exhortatory purpose to encourage religious observance was apparent.' 6 ' But the question
158.

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449 (1961).

159.

1d. at 452.

160.

Ibid.

161. Id. at 433. A Massachusetts Bay instruction is quoted by the Court:
"And to the end the Sabbath may be celebrated in a religious manner ....
" A
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being examined here is whether any minimum of religious influence
stemming from state action can be labelled that form of coercion
which serves to distinguish an establishment of religion. Under such
a standard even the modern statutes have a significance on influencing men's conduct in regard to religious belief and practice. As Justice Warren noted in his comparison of the case with McCollum, there
are a number of activities which individuals may busy themselves
with on Sunday other than church-going whereas children may be
more limited in a study hall waiting for the school bell to ring. But
this only establishes that the form and weight of the effect is different. If one is an establishment of religion, and the other not, the difference must either lie in those features extraneous to the single
feature of coercion, or in the fact that the degree of coercion in one
arrangement is measurably more important than in another. If the
former is the case, then the legal standard of coercion to define establishment would seem inadequate. If the latter is the correct alternative, then the question must be raised why it would not be more
efficient to test the matter first under an analysis of how free exercise
is affected, since ordinarily coercion is provable only as it operates on
an individual. Why judge the weight of compulsion in the mass, as
it were, before the more manageable assessment of effect on an
individual is made?
Yet it might be maintained that the radiations of certain governmental involvements are so subtle and empirically elusive that they
cannot be reliably detected under the standard of free exercise, and
yet should count in any final judgment whether such action is permitted under the First Amendment. It may be, in other words, that
what has been designated "coercion" in the decisions we have been
discussing is actually a reflection of some element in the challenged
arrangements which affects to an improper degree the quality of religious freedom as understood by the justices. This is merely another
way of contending that the establishment clause is broader than the
free exercise clause and not restricted to only those verifiable burdens
on religion which an individual can demonstrate in a court of law. To
the degree that this explanation becomes merely an exhortation to
trust in the judgment of the Court to know what is desirable and
what not in the American environment, it may lack persuasion to
some ears. To the degree that it promises a principled theory of how
these more subtle influences are to be recognized, it seems to admit
Sunday law from New York in 1695 began "Whereas, the true and sincere worship
of God according to his holy will and commandments, is often profaned and
neglected by many of the Inhabitants and sojourners in this province .... " Id. at
n. 10.
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that the factor of coercion in its ordinary meaning is not the instrument for elaboration.
And the cases themselves have tended to indicate that the Court no
longer, if it ever did, conceives of coercion as being a defining instrument by which to plumb the reaches of the establishment concept. In
the Engel case, Justice Black for the majority referred again to the
overlap of coverage between the two parts of the Amendment, but
specifically stated "they forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom."' 6 2 The establishment
clause was differentiated from the free exercise clause in that it does
not demand any "direct governmental compulsion."' 6 3 There may be
violation of the First Amendment "by the enactment of laws which
establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to
coerce nonobserving individuals or not."' 1 6 4 Justice Black then continued:
This is not to say, of course, that laws officially prescribing
a particular form of religious worship do not involve coercion of such individuals. When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular
religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved re6
ligion is plain.' 5
Read broadly, this comment would seem to indicate that an establishment always contains coercion, and offer some encouragement to the
hope that in a contemplation of those "indirect coercive pressures"
there lies the path of illumination. What the statement means in context, however, is that the confirmation of the presence of establishment in the constitutional sense depends on criteria other than the
recognizable burdens laid on individuals in their religious activities,
even though often that which establishes may also practically affect
the free exercise of religion by individuals.
RELIGION AS AN OBJECT OF LEGISLATION
The determination of the circumstances under which actions of
government impermissibly interfere with or impede the exercise of
religious convictions of an individual is a difficult task, but a manageable one.16 6 A fairly consistent standard has' been employed, and
162.
163.
164.
165.

370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
Ibid.
Id. at 430-31.
Id. at 430-31.
166. A thorough review of free exercise problems is contained in Fernandez,
The Free Exercise of Religion, 36 So. CALIF. L. REV. 546 (1963).
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while the balancing of the interest of the state in a particular matter
against the burden on the individual may excite exceedingly delicate
judgments, the opportunity to refer the decision to a definable interest
of an individual helps to provide a framework for re-evaluations and
7
critical analyses. "Predicated on coercion," as Justice Clark wrote16
the free exercise clause offers opportunity for a contest between two
adversaries over the restraining effect of a state enactment. The
establishment prohibition, however, as thus far considered, has
escaped compression into a recognizable and acceptable formula
whose application can be similarly examined. Efforts to expand it to
bar all points of contact between church and state, the "wall" mentality, have shown themselves unhistorical and unworkable. At the
same time, the intimations that establishment may differ from free
exercise by the measure of some indirect coercive effects present in
prohibited state involvements have not been confirmed. A third
tributary of judicial thought has meanwhile been engrossed with a
rationale for establishment that places emphasis on the object or
purpose with which the state action touches religion. The relationship between the two forces is studied from the viewpoint of what
aims and ends of legislation relative to religion should be condemned.
The Everson formulation itself contains a literal semblance of this
method of distinguishing an establishment, though it sweeps indiscriminatively over matters of free exercise as well. Removed from
the separationist philosopy with which it is usually interpreted, the
paragraph enumerates certain categories of state objectives vis-a-vis
religion which are forbidden. They include the setting up of a church,
the passage of laws which aid or prefer religion, the subsidization of
religious activities or institutions through taxes, and the participation
in the affairs of a religious organization.16 8 Of these, the fulcrum for
several decisions has been the prohibition against aid, preference or
promotion of religion.
What constitutes aid and promotion of religion did not receive any
detailed analysis in the cases immediately following Everson Justice
Black apparently thought it obvious that the released time program of
McCollum was state aid to religion. This inference was drawn from
the "utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public
school system" and the use of the compulsory public school machinery. 16 9 Such economic assistance as might be provided to partici167. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
168. Also included in the formulation, note 93 supra, are prohibitions against
forcing or influencing a person to go or remain away from church, and punishing
a person for professing religious belief or disbelief. These would seem to be
primarily free exercise issues.
169.

333 U.S. at 210 (1948).
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pating denominations by the use of classrooms and utilities would
hardly recommend itself as the basis for the holding, though this was
one of the grounds on which Justice Douglas distinguished the case
from the Zorach program. 17 0 It is difficult to believe that the decision
of the Court in McClloum would have been different if the religious
groups participating in the program had agreed to rent the rooms
during the period of the instruction, or pay the light and heat bill.
Whatever aid was present for religion in McCollum would seem to consist of the cooperation between the public school authorities and the
religious groups in offering the instructional program. The coercive
effects which might be attributed to this program have been discussed
in a prior section, with the position being urged that such a factor
is better tested initially under the free exercise clause.
Putting aside the question of direct or indirect coercion, which
was largely a second thought explanation of why the program was
objectionable, why should the program either in McCollum or Zorach
be considered as an aid to religion rather than what Justice Reed
called "those incidental advantages that religious bodies, with other
groups similarly situated, obtain as a by-product of organized
society.,171 The questons raised by the dissent are still worth asking
in seeking an insight to the meaning of establishment:
I find it difficult to extract from the opinions and conclusion
as to what it is in the Champaign plan that is unconstitutional. Is it the use of school buildings for religious instruction; the release of pupils by the schools for religious
instruction during school hours; the so-called assistance by
teachers in handing out the request cards to pupils, in keeping lists of them for release and records of their attendance;
or the action of the principals in arranging an opportunity
for the classes and the appearance of the Council's instructors.'17 2
170. The author of the Zorach opinion points out that "All costs, including
the application blanks, are paid by the religious organizations." 343 U.S. at 309.
The importance of the element of cost to Justice Douglas is emphasized in the
Engel case, see note 126 supra. In the McCollum case, Justice Jackson took a
different position on the significance of the cost item: "But the cost is neither
substantial nor measurable, and no one seriously can say that the complainant's
tax bill has been proved to be increased because of this plan." Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 234 (1949). However, the Court refers
to the McCollum case as involving the use of tax-supported buildings, to distinguish it from Sunday closing laws, In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 452-53
(1961).
171. Ulinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 249 (19491
(dissenting opinion).
172. Id.at 240.
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Part of the answer as to why involvement in released time programs
has been considered establishment is the special civic values which
members of the Court attribute to the public school. Significantly, a
good part of the modern litigation in the church-state field has been
drawn out of that public institution. For Justice Frankfurter, this
agency is a "symbol of our secular unity." 17 3 In his McCollum opinion
he devoted much of his attention to the evolution of the common school
in this country, remarking that its development was also "the story of
changing conceptions regarding the American democratic society, of
the functions of State-maintained education in such a society, and of
74
the role therein of the free exercise of religion by the people."'
Recognizing that the secularization of the schools had been achieved
over serious objections and multiple disputes, Justice Frankfurter did
not minimize the fact that "prohibition of the commingling of sectarian and secular instruction in the public school is of course only
half the story." 175 The instances of cooperation between church and
state which swung the balance for Justice Reed in favor of the constitutionality of the Champaign program, were not controlling with
Frankfurter as far as schools were concerned. Against the background of sectarian strife which had prompted the educational
developments in the various states, he concluded that the released time
programs represented a fusion of governmental functions with those
of religious sects.
This same ineffable quality of the public schools is celebrated by
Justice Brennan in his extensive statement in Schempp of his churchstate theory. What makes the intrusion of the religion element constitutionally objectionable is that the "public schools serve a uniquely
public function: the training of American citizens in an atmosphere
free of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of any sort - an
atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heritage common to
all American groups and religions."' 1 7 6 What this type of reasoning
means in terms of a First Amendment philosophy is that the distinctive public nature of an institution dictates that all manifestations
of the free exercise of religion be excluded. Justice Stewart issues the
challenge in this regard when he questions whether the rights of free
exercise or, more broadly, the interests of religious freedom, can be
satisfied with an explanation that parents who desire religion in their
173. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 217 (1948)
(concurring opinion).
174. Id. at 214.
175.
176.
opinion).

Id. at 220.
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241-42

(1963)

(concurring
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children's education must pay the price of the private school and give
up their opportunity to employ the public facility."' 1 7 7
For Justices Frankfurter and Brennan, the urgency of keeping the
public school untouched by religious factors does seem to demand
that choice. The latter puts the matter in unmistakable terms:
The choice which is thus preserved is between a public
secular education with its uniquely democratic values, and
some form of private, or sectarian education, which offers
values of its own. In my judgment the First Amendment
forbids the State to inhibit that freedom of choice by
diminishing the attractiveness of either alternative - either
by restricting the liberty of the private schools to inculcate
whatever values they wish, or by jeopardizing the freedom
of the public school from private or sectarian pressures.17 8
There are echoes of Justice Rutledge's double price for religious
freedom here, but what represents a variation in the approach is the
clear willingness of both Justices to admit the prudential nature of
their judgments. Each insists that the conclusion is one steeped in
the particular facts of a specific institution, and that all involvements
7
between state and church may not be similarly banned. 1 9
As a political or educational judgment on the merits of such state
schools may have much to recommend it. What causes concern, however, is the caliber of the credentials by which this view claims constitutional weight. While Justice Frankfurter has available the
historical evidence of state trends away from religious programs in
the schools in the nineteenth century, he must still translate those
heterogeneous patterns into constitutional doctrine. It is not enough
to quote President Grant or even Elihu Root on the matter, to conclude that the Constitution removes the choice from the power of the
177. A discussion of the differences between Justices Brennan and Stewart
in this regard is found in Pollack, Public Prayers in Public Schools, 77 Harv. L.
Rev. 62, 75-77 (1963).
178. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 242 (1963) (concurring opinion).
Justice Frankfurter expressed the same conclusion in these words, "The claims
of religion were not minimized by refusing to make the public schools agencies
for their assertion. The non-sectarian or secular public school was the means of
reconciling freedom in general with religious freedom." fllinois ex rel. McCollum
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216 (1948) (concurring opinion).
179. Justice Brennan, concurring in School Board v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
232 (1963), specifically states ". . . it is my view that not every involvement of
religion in public life is unconstitutional ....
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in
McCollum, 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948), emphasizes the need for case-by-case decelopment of the "spacious conception" of church-state separation.
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state.' 8 0 A wit has remarked that public schools are indeed a National Shinto, but even a ritual of Americanism does not offer complete
immunity from demands that the Court buttress its conclusions with
propositions which draw their strength out of neutral principle and
reason. That there is a fuzziness about the judgment that public
schools represent a special subject for constitutional purposes is suggested by the poverty of Justice Brennan's formulation of "too close
a proximity"''1
as the reason for objection to these religious programs.
But certain definable standards for the conclusion of establishment
in the public school situations are attempted in the opinions.' S 2 The
first which might be mentioned is the judicial specification of the
divisive elements introduced into the community by the intrusion of
religion into public schools. The watermark of establishment in this
regard is the accentuation and sharpening of consciousness of religious differences, Justice Frankfurter asserts.'8 3 An apprenhension
also arises that the appearance of religion in the school environment
will inevitably produce unequal treatment of sects because of the
practical difficulty of providing for a diversity of views with the
limited number of programs that can operate. Either a preference
for one religion will appear in the implementation of the programs,
or the dominance of religious beliefs over nonbelief will be promoted
de facto by the consideration that formal religious views assume
organizational shape while non-belief and individualized spiritual
commitments do not. Thus some views may not be represented in the
programs. Christianity itself is splintered into innumerable sects,
some of a size which would not justify participation. The availability in a given community of interested Jewish participants for a
program, or teachers of Buddism, Taoism, Ethical Culture or Secular
Humanism is another question to be considered.18 4 Furthermore,
180. The reference to Grant in the McCollum opinion, 333 U.S. at 218, constitutes "what must be the first tribute ever paid him as a political philosopher,"
according to Hutchins, op. cit. supra note 121, at 18.
181. School Board v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259 1963): "... the Establishment Clause embodied the Farmers' conclusion that government and religion have
discreet interests which are mutually best served when each avoids too close a
proximity to the other."
182. The object at this stage is to consider legal standards other than
those based on notions of complete separation of church and state, or indirect
coercive effects, subjects which were considered earlier in this article.
183. Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 228 (1948)
(concurring opinion).
184. All of these are religions for purposes of the First Amendment,
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495, n. 11 (1961).
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some of these groups may choose not to participate; for some, it may
be unholy to do so.
There are several edges to this general approach of detecting
establishment by reference to the anticipated divisive and preferential effects of a given state program. The first is the possibility that
in practical operation the program will materially burden a nonparticipant in a way to coerce his religious choice. Conceivably that
might be isolated as a free exercise question. On the other hand to
the degree that all involvements with religion must be sensitive to
pluralism, since to consider religion at all in the United States is to
recognize first the diversity, an outright condemnation of all divisive signs as establishments is simply unrealistic. Sunday closing laws
would be divisive in that sense.
There might be an intermediate position, for purpose of defining
establishment, between those state programs which merely reflect
the inevitable consciousness of religious difference on the one side,
and those which specifically inhibit an individual's religious exercise,
on the other. This median could be described in terms of the probability, in a given involvement between state and religion, that strife
between sects will result. The test that would be employed would
depend upon an estimation of how a governmental link with religion
would affect the jealousies and rivalries of varying religious and nonreligious views.
The Court has apparently purported to employ some such guide
in the decisions, but unfortunately the judicial effort has more often
a way of making a conclusion than a serious pragmatic judgment of
the consequences of these involvements for civic peace. In this constitutional area perhaps more than in others, the Court has found it
hard to pass up temptations to utter colorful condemnations that
often come closer to being declamations than close judgments of
societal consequences. Justice Black in striking down the in-premises
released time program evoked the picture of colonial disputes "where
zealous sectarians entrusted with governmental power to further their
causes would sometimes torture, maim and kill those they branded
'heretics,' 'atheists' or 'agnostics.' Ill85 Again in the Engel case, the
same frenetic tone was applied to the judgment of non-sectarian
Regents prayer, the saying of which was voluntary, by the recollection "that governments of the past had shackled men's tongues to
make them speak and to pray only to the God that government
wanted them to pray to."'18 6 The excitations of such alarms to explain
185.
186.

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319 (1952)
370 U.S.421,435 (1962).

(dissenting opinion).
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the defining marks of the modern establishment are extravagant but
worse, they are self-defeating. For the same inflated fears of governmental domination of men's beliefs which are purveyed by these words
may be turned in rash judgment against the Court itself, which is
then accused of manifesting official hostility to all religions.
Still the evaluation of consequences of certain involvements with
religion need not be made a rhetorical weapon. What the Court has
more carefully attempted in several instances is the enumeration of
the dangers which were feared by the writers of the Amendment and
then determine whether the program being challenged in a given case
threatens to produce those results. 18 7 There is obviously much to
recommend this approach. The trouble has been that the purposes of
the Amendment can only be formulated in a distressingly broad way.
When one has said that the avoidance of religious strife is an object
of the establishment clause, the reduction of this principle to the
specifics of a McCollum or Zorach program is not made noticeably
easier. A judgment must still be made whether a particular arrangement is "real threat" or "mere shadow' 8 8 in terms of its hazardous
consequences. In the last analyses, is the determination that religious
programs in the public schools constitute a penetration of the constitutional zone anything more than a reflection of the sensibilities
and prejudices of the justices? One can think of worse methods of
deciding such vexed questions than entrusting them to a bench of
Justices, and but one may also be able to think of better ways.' 8 9 At
any rate, most would agree that if the judges are to make these delicate judgments their efforts should be directed to the articulation of
some rational grounds upon which to explain the choice.
Some forms of governmental interest in religion are clearly proscribed by the establishment clause since they would align governmental power behind a particular religious institution or view and
create dangers for religious freedoms. The selection of a test oath in
the Torcaso case is one example. The state there exacts a commitment to a belief in God as the price of serving it and performing
public functions. The attitude of the Framers to such oaths is
shown by Article VI of the Constitution eliminating religious tests
dealing with federal offices. That such requirements do represent a
187. E.g., Justice Brennan concurring in School Dist. v Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 232-242 (1963).
188.. Id. at 308 (Justice Goldberg concurring).
189. Dean Erwin Griswold has expressed the regret that the Engel case
was ever thought of "as a matter for judicial decision..." Absolute is the Dark,
8 UTAH L. REv. 167, 173-74 (1963). For another skeptical view about the wisdom
of resolving such questions through judicial rule, see Sutherland, supra note 9,
at 39-45.
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state judgment on the validity of a religious belief is apparent in the
justification usually urged that the oath assures the integrity of the
officeholder. If an historic establishment would not have been violated
by such a condition, there is little ground to argue that it does not
interfere with the free exercise of religion. And where establishment
is interpreted more broadly than mere preference- between sects, one
immediate area of the expanded coverage would seem to be state
specification of religious view as a condition for participation in
government.
Other examples of deliberate state promotion of religion can be
suggested which undoubtedly should be included within the reach of
an establishment concept that goes beyond the historic sense of that
term. The earlier colonial legislation pertaining to the Sabbath,
examples of which were cited in the McGowan case, 1 9 0 specifically
states that its purpose is to preserve the holiness and religious
character of the Sunday. Little controversy would be stirred by the
finding of establishment in the legislative purpose described by the
instructive words "And to the end the Sabbath may be celebrated in
a religious manner. .. "191 If that is the primary object of the
exercise of state power, its tolerance for diversity of Christian sentiment should not protect it from being held unconstitutional. To jar
complacency of Christians, Justice Douglas multiplies examples of
the same type of involvement as it might appear in non-Christian
lands: state compulsion of fast during Ramadan; preservation of the
sacredness of Friday or Saturday by requiring cessation of all commercial activity; prohibition of sales of pork because of religious
scruples. These examples ignore the additional facts which could
create the different question actually raised by McGowan, where both
secular and sacred purposes were mingled. But they serve to illustrate
what would clearly be promotions of religion if unimpaired by any
purpose other than the sacred.
The difficulty comes, however, not in choosing instances of state
action which easily qualify as aid or promotion of religion, but in
stating a principle which will apply meaningfully to the variety of
situations where involvement with religion may occur. It was toward
the formulation of such a principle that Justice Frankfurter devoted
part of his opinion in the Sunday closing cases. Starting with the
assumption that the establishment clause covers more than the
traditional established church, Justice Frankfurter approaches his
task with the enunciation of an absolute disqualification of the state
from any concern or competence with "a specific, but comprehensive,
190.

See note 161, supra.

191.

Ibid.
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199

area of human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some
transcendental idea and man's expression in action of that belief or
disbelief." 19 2 The lingering temper of separationist thought must
explain the extravagance of such a statement, for apparently it does
not mean to prohibit a legislature from a concern for religious belief
to the extent of granting an exemption from certain statutory requirements specifically based on those grounds.' 9 3 And man's "expression
in action" of a religious belief does not disqualify the legislature from
a competence to prohibit it, if that belief happens to be polygamy.' 9 4
The interesting point about such a statement is not what it says,1 9 5
but that the attitude it reflects about how the job of explanation
should be begun. A rhetoric bar between religion and government is
drawn against which the specification of principle is to be made.
The reduction of this broadside to the dimensions of a legal principle is achieved by specifying that the concern about religion which
is prohibited to the state is the affirmation or promotion of religious
doctrine:
If the primary end achieved by a form of regulation is the
affirmation or promotion of religious doctrine - primary in
the sense that 'all secular ends which it purportedly serves
are derivative from, not wholly independent of, the advancement of religion - the regulation is beyond the power of
the state. 19 6
This refinement still leaves the problem of distinguishing between
what is and what is not "affirmation or promotion of religious doctrine." By a quick reference, Justice Frankfurter indicates that he
considers his standard exemplified by the McCollum case, a comment
that evokes again the consideration of how precisely religion was
promoted or affirmed in the released time situation. It is only argu192.

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466 (1961) (concurring opinion).
193. Justice Frankfurter refers to those states which do provide exemptions
for Sabbatarians, Id. at 514-15, and comments "However preferable, personally,
one might deem such an exception, I cannot find that the Constitution compels
it." Id. at 520.
194. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
195. Justice Frankfurter deflates the sentence quoted in the text by this
additional explanation: "Neither the National Government nor under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. a State may, by any device, support belief or the expression of belief for its own sake, whether from conviction of the truth of that belief, or from conviction that the propagation of
that belief the civil welfare of the State is served, or because a majority of its
citizens, holding that belief, are offended when all do not hold it." McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466 (1961) (concurring opinion).
196. Id. at 466.
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mentative to suggest that the McCollum program might be more
accurately designated recognition of religious doctrine rather than
affirmation or promotion? Suspicions that the matter is not beyond
debate are encouraged by the variety of explanations which have been
noted for the decision: the element of coercion; the financial aid
rendered in the use of classroom and minor administrative services;
the unique character of the public school settin. This diversity may
manifest the singular validity of the conclusion, but it may as well
19 7
raise doubts about the conclusion reached by the Court.
The idea which plainly lies behind the Frankfurter test is sometimes expressed in the summary form that the state may not further
religion ends as such. This statement presumably also includes the
further qualification which is made explicit in the Justice's opinion
in McGowan, that where the ends of a statute are both secular and
religious, that law cannot stand if the secular ends could be attained
by other means which do not have consequence for the promotion of
religion.' 9 8
If one starts with the understanding that promotion of religious
doctrine under this test is exemplified by the McCollum arrangement,
the consistency of application of the standard creates difficulties.
What secular ends are served by the ordinary community services
provided to churches? Yet Justice Frankfurter makes it clear that
when individuals use their religious freedom to build these churches,
the state "may guard its people's safety by extending fire and police
protection to the churches so built."' 1 9 9 The protection of life and
property which ensues from state action in this regard might seem
to be ends which are "derivative from, not wholly independent of, the
advancement of religion." Both the person and the property are devoted, at the precise time the state is asked to take an interest, to
religious worship and doctrine.
If, however, it is maintained that the presence of the individual,
and the involvement because now the state is only reflecting its
197. Justice Brennan essays what may be still another explanation of
the establishment of McCollum when, in distinguishing it from Zorach, he writes
"... the McCollum program placed the religious instructor in the public school
classroom in precisely the position of authority held by the regular teachers of
secular subjects while the Zorach program did not. . . . To be sure, a religious
teacher presumably commands substantial respect and merits attention in his
own right. But the Constitution does not permit that prestige and capacity for
influence to be augmented by investiture of all the symbols of authority at the
command of the lay teacher for the enhancement of secular instruction." School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 262-63 (1963) (concurring opinion).
198. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 467 (1961) (concurring opinion).
199. Ibid.
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awareness of the fact that citizens do go to church and practice
religion, then how explain McCollum? The Religion Council which
sought instructional time in the public schools was merely a reflection
of the interests of a number of individual citizens. The state was
being asked to recognize that fact and made provision for it.
In both cases, moreover, the proposition might be advanced that
secular ends are being served. Both fire protection for churches, and
released time programs on school premises, achieve the secular end
of accommodating various denominations and their members who wish
to perform acts, i.e., build a church or teach a religion class. This
accommodation may be aimed at groups which are religious in nature,
but its end is the effectuation of the secular interest of maximizing
religious freedom. However paradoxical it may sound, religious freedom is a secular concern. Indeed, the very principles which the Court
has so vigorously expounded underline the truth that it is only as a
secular matter that the state can be concerned for this freedom, that
is, the state cannot purport to defend religious freedom under a theory
that religion is to be preferred to every other available ideological
outlook on life.
The point urged here is that there are numerous instances in which
the state takes cognizance of religion doctrine where the only secular
end to be served by the regulation involved is the value of religious
freedom itself. The Pennsylvania statute challenged in Two Guys v.
McGinley made an exception to the prohibition on exhibition of motion pictures prior to 2 p.m. on Sunday for religious pictures shown
by churches, provided they were shown on church property and without admission charge. 20 0 The exemption of conscientious objectors
from active military service represents a state purpose derivative
from the religious position of the applicant for the exemption. The
Sherbert case not only permits such affirmation of religion, but compels it as a constitutional mandate. If these are said not to represent
affirmances or promotions of religious doctrine, how do they differ
from McCollum?
There crystallizes out of a study of the Frankfurter approach a
basic difficulty about identifying the conditions under which state
treatment of religion affirms it, or aids, prefers, advances or assists
it. These verbs carry an enormous weight in the proposed formulation, a weight which may sqeeze significant meaning out of the terms.
Perhaps in response to the uncertainty of what these verbs mean,
Justice Brennan in Schempp follows the common statement of constitutional protection against discrimination or preference of religious
200. 366 U.S. 582, 586 (1961).
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sect with a list of those types of involvements between religious and
secular institutions which he believes are also enjoined. These are
involvements which
(a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious
institutions
(b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or
(c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental
2 01
ends where secular means would suffice.
The last category is the one under which he concludes the Biblereading programs are invalid. 20 2 Presumably it would also cover
the Torcaso oath, used to assure faithful and honest public service.
All three of the listings are generally within the scope of the Frankfurter test in that they represent state actions which either serve,
employ the organs of government for, or use, "essentially religious
activities or means."
Despite the greater specificity of this statement, questions may be
asked about its reliability. Justice Brennan is as sensitive as any of
his colleagues to the tenuous character of some of the judgments
necessary in this field. On the one hand he recognizes the need to
guard against those dangers which inspired the Framers to include
the establishment clause, but he is equally aware that "religious
differences among Americans have important and pervasive implications for our society." 20 3 One indication that his effort to summarize
the distilled essence of these two factors is imperfect is seen in the
list of instances he gives where church-state accommodations would
be permissible.2 0 4 In stating the rationale for some of these accommodations, Justice Brennan does not face the challenge of explaining
how they fit his scheme of First Amendment involvements. It is
difficult to see why service chaplaincies do not "serve the essentially
201. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963) (concurring opinion).
202. That category would be applicable on the assumption (for purposes
of argument) that the devotional exercises serve some legitimate nonreligious
purpose. Id. at 293-94.
203. Id. at 295.
204. In the concluding parts of his opinion, Justice Brennan reviews and
finds unobjectionable such state involvements as the provisions of churches and
chaplains at military establishments and penal institutions, draft exemptions for
ministers, excusal of children from school for religious holidays, temporary use
of public buildings by churches in disaster or emergency, invocational prayers In
legislative chambers, non-devotional use of the Bible In public schools, tax
exemptions for churches and religious institutions, public welfare grants on a
nondiscriminatory basis for individuals "who become eligible wholly or partially
for religious reasons." Id. at 296-304, 302.
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religious activities of religious institutions," or why legislative prayer
is not employment of "the organs of government for essentially religious purpose." His examples, which are commonly accepted as constitutional instances of accommodation, at least create doubts about
the viability of the announced standards. A point comes in the multiplication of exceptions to a rule when the question must be asked
what purpose the rule itself serves. The willingness to tolerate the
exceptions rather than recast the rule is perhaps itself indicative of
the felt complexity of the task, and the operation of subconscious
preferences to which even judges are subject.
Both Justices Frankfurter and Brennan have set their sights on a
defining expression of those church-state links which are proscribed
by the establishment clause. It is doubtful that their marksmanship
has been notably successful. They both start with an unwillingness
to admit that government may contemplate directly and purposefully
the manifestations of religious belief, individually or by group, in the
society. Their analysis seems to contain the implicit hope that conventional involvements between church and state can be explained as
no more than indirect contacts. As the nature of the deviations from
their standards begin to appear, each admits that the line he is
holding is not completely defensible or mathematically precise.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AS A GUIDE
Despite the doctrinal confusion stemming out of shifting attempts
to define the limits of the establishment clause, certain propositions
concerning the First Amendment have remained relatively constant
as orienting principles for the Court. The first of these is that the
ultimate purpose of the religion clauses is the protection of religious
freedom. 2 0 5 While opinions might differ in the concrete as to what
this freedom entails and how it is to be achieved, the Court has never
been prepared to maintain formally, what it has sometimes been
accused of implying in its interpretations, that the Amendment is
either ecclesiology and religious philosophy, or calculated disfran205. The most recent expression of that view is by Justice Goldberg In
Schempp: "The basic purpose of the religion clause of the First Amendment is to
promote and assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for
all and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope of attainment of
that end." 374 U.S. at 305. In Everson, Justice Black referred to the Amendment's
purpose as "protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty. .. "
330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947). Justice Frankfurter described the fight for disestablishment as "the struggle to free all men, whatever their theological views, from
state-compelled obligation to acknowledge and support state-favored faiths.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 460 (1961) (concurring opinion).
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chisement of all religious influence on the state. 2 06 Religious freedom
grants the individual the right to "establish" his own church and to
accept as binding its decisions on matters of morals, even though
from one perspective he thereby subordinates his individual decisions
to that of a church. At the same time, religious ideas and opinions
may be carried by individuals into the public domain for whatever
persuasive or enlightening value they have in regard to matters of
governmental interest.
The limitations which the First Amendment imposes are thus
limitations on government, and not on the individual. These restrictions are designed to allow everyone the maximum freedom in regard
to religious conviction and action without any interference by the
state on these matters. In one sense, it is true to say that the Amendment protects government from religion, but this must be understood
in a special sense. It is not that religious bodies in a state radiate evil
or subversive tendencies, or that any contact with them is detrimental
to the state. That would imply that the Framers were skeptical about
the worth of religion, where it is quite clear that their keen appreciation of its value, along with the eminently pragmatic political wisdom
which sought to keep religious dissention out of the federal area, led
to the adoption of the Amendment. The specific danger to government
which the Amendment is concerned with is the possibility that organized religion will use the state for its own purposes to the detriment
of religious liberty. For what the divinely-sanctioned or cleric-ridden
government will tend to do is prescribe what religious truth is. That
is ultimately what separation was meant to avoid. So separation
serves religious liberty by rendering government neutral and incompetent on matters of religious dogma and practice.
The particular manner, then, in which the Amendment protects
religious liberty is a negative one. The Framers were not affirmatively
setting forth what religious liberty consists in or how the individual
should employ his freedom. Rather they were isolating the state from
interference with this freedom by forbidding laws respecting an establishment and laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion. A start
toward an integral reading of the clauses may be made by asking in
what respects the two portions of the Amendment service this overriding purpose of religious liberty by their leashing of government.
The free exercise clause projects a relatively clear picture in terms
of service done to religious liberty, for the prohibition of governmental
interference in this area relates to complaints by an individual or
206. See Murray, The Problem of Pluralism in America, 1 CATH. LAWYER
223, 229-236 (1955).
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legal entity alleging a measurable impediment to worship or religious
practice as a result of state action. Whatever the state's purpose or
object in pursuing a particular course, be it secular or religious in
character, the constitutional test is whether such action infringes the
exercise of religion.
Turning to the establishment clause, one is immediately aware that
the service it performs for religious freedom is not so apparent or
simple of statement. Yet there is still much that is clear. Surely no
one would doubt that governmental efforts to choose one set of religious beliefs and give them official endorsement as theologically preferable to all others would be a direct attack on religious freedom.
Whether sanctions were put behind these chosen beliefs or not, the
characterization of one view of ultimate reality as more "American"
or acceptable than another would involve the state in judgments for
which it has no competence. Similarly, since religious freedom in the
political sense must include the right not to believe, the government
could not formally align itself with Christianity, or Deism, or religiosity generally because, again, the evaluation of various spiritual
outlooks is not within the objectives of government. These kinds of
state involvements should be considered establishments for a practical
reason, too, for governmental action to settle religious truth is almost
always accompanied by pressures or persuasions on behalf of a religion, or all religions. Normally, in other words, these official endorsements of theological views would produce an effect on someone's free
exercise of religion. When Maryland used a religious means to assure
the honesty of its public officials through the test oath, pressure was
invariably brought to bear on individuals who did not believe in
God. 2 0 7 Since these governmental backings of religious truth can
ordinarily have significance only if they are tied in with some public
benefit or privilege, they simultaneously create free exercise issues.
But even without such an effect, an analysis of the relevant historical
background and an assessment of our traditions pertaining to the
role of government would support a prohibition against state creation
or evaluation of sacred things. Even though no child in the New York
classroom had its free exercise of religion infringed, the fact that
state agents composed the prayer in the Engel case constituted establishment.2 08
In addition to those situations where the state endorses or expresses
theological views, establishment would seem to be the conclusion
whenever the state singles out a religion, or religions generally, for
direct financial assistance. Rather than purporting to determine theo207.

Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).

208.

370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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logical truth directly as in the endorsement of beliefs, the government
through taxation would be aiding and preferring a particular exponent
of religious truth. This type of assistance Justice Reed defined as "a
purposeful assistance directly to the church itself or to some religious
group or organization doing religious work of such a character that
20 9
it may fairly be said to be performing ecclesiastical functions."1
Both the enormous state power over religion which such dependence
would serve to encourage, and the strong historical identification of
such programs with establishment, would point to the conclusion that
such aid threatened religious liberty.
While economic aid directly to religion may be a readily identified
form of prohibited association, the principle under which it may be
banned is actually broader than mere financing. Any time preference
for one church, or all religions as against irreligion, is the object of
state action, establishment would seem to be the conclusion. But the
question of consuming importance in this regard is what :exactly is
meant by preference or aid if no direct subsidies are involved. When
no coercion is directed against an individual in his religious exercise
and when the governmental purpose is not the expression of religious
truth, what are the signs of establishment? A review of the judicial
thinking from Everson to the present shows a gradual awareness that
the standard cannot be mere recognition or cognizance of religion by
the state. As Justice Brennan said in Schempp, "Nothing in the Constitution compels the organ of government to be blind to what everyone else perceives--that religious differences among Americans have
important and pervasive implications for our society. ' 2 1 0 Thus it
will not do to speak as if the mere fact that religion becomes an
object of state concern is enough to condemn the action as establishment.
Having disposed of obvious cases, the testing question becomes:
what other forms of state involvement with religion pose real hazards
for religious freedom? If it is recognized that coercion will not always
be present to identify the objectionable relationships, and further
understood that the civic and spiritual dimensions of human life are
not antipodal, the enormous difficulty of that question begins to appear. The reticulated complexity of the question-dealing as it does
with the countless ways in which church and state make contactmay make some wonder whether the Supreme Court is the proper
agency to supply an answer. The assumption that all issues are best
209. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 248 (1948)
(dissenting opinion).
210. 374 U.S. 203, 295 (1963).
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resolved as legal ones has been challenged,2 1 1 and the wisdom of a
bevy of Platonic Guardians has been doubted. 2 1 2 Nevertheless, the
Court is for good or bad engrossed in the attempt to provide a rational
foundation for judging all such involvements between church and
state. What factors are to be assessed in such an undertaking, assuming the object is the preservation of religious freedom?
One source of help which has steadily become more important to
the Court is the bearing which the free exercise clause has on the
interpretation of establishment. As Justice Brennan has expressed
it, "There are certain practices, conceivably violative of the Establishment Clause, the striking down of which might seriously interfere
with certain religious liberties also protected by the First Amendment.", 2 1 3 The implications of this sentence regarding the soundness
of past doctrine are striking. In effect the statement admits that the
Court's opinions have created a tension between the establishment
clause and religious liberties. In fact, it is a common slip of the pen
to contrast the establishment prohibition with religious freedom as
protected by the free exercise clause. Yet it seems indefensible to
argue that there is some undefined relationship called establishment,
restrictive of both state power and the political activities of religious
individuals, which cannot be permitted even though its consequences
for religious liberty are nil. Whatever is condemned as establishment
must be condemned on the basis that it imperils religious freedom or
affects it adversely. The problem is trying to define what are the
marks of such perils. Justice Brennan is pointing out that the Court,
while it need not limit the scope of establishment to the sole measure
of imminent restrictions of an individual's freedom, should at least
recognize that where the very conclusion of establishment impedes
the religious freedom of others, caution is called for in reaching that
result.
But what does Justice Brennan mean by religious freedom in this
context? It is significant that he does not restrict himself to only
those cases where the establishment conclusion simultaneously represents a denial of someone's free exercise. That is, it is not necessary
to first determine under existing doctrine whether an individual would
have a valid free exercise claim if the state involvement being challenged were declared an establishment. The very example which Jus211. See note 189, supra.
212. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958). "For myself it would be most
irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to
choose them, which I assuredly do not. If they were in charge, I should miss the
stimulus of living in a society where I have, at least theoretically, some part
in the direction of public affairs."
213. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296 (1963) (concurring opinion).
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tice Brennan employs to make his point, state provision of chaplains
for members of the armed forces, may not be a constitutional requirement of the free exercise clause. At least he does not deem it essential
to establish that point, since he concludes "I do not say that governments must provide chaplains .. .,,214 Hence the religious freedom
which the Court ought to consider as part of its determination
whether a particular involvement is an establishment includes the
freedom of the person benefiting from the governmental program.
And this element is relevant even though a free exercise claim is
untenable against the threatened conclusion of the establishment bar.
This conception of religious freedom in the board sense as limiting
the meaning of establishment has much to recommend it. A distortion of the meaning of religious freedom occurs when it is translated
as nothing more than free exercise of religion in the legal sense. The
latter represents the extremities of state power as it may bear on an
individual and his religious beliefs; it does not describe or reflect the
extremity of religious freedom as it may be enjoyed by the individual
acting as citizen. The free exercise standard is a guide to what the
state cannot do under the Constitution, but it does not tell us what
the individual can do by way of exercising his religious freedom in
the civic environment. Hence there is every reason, in deciding under
what circumstances a governmental involvement with religion is
prohibited, to look at the practical effect which a decision will have
on the opportunity of persons in the society to enjoy their full reli2 15
gious freedom.
The conflict of which Justice Brennan spoke, then, is not only between the two parts of the First Amendment. Obviously when the
legal standards for free exercise are violated by prohibiting certain
governmental actions labelled establishment, the Amendment is being
read to put its parts at cross-purposes with each other. In that situation, the certainty of the burden which will fall on the individual
would seem to dictate that the idea of establishment be re-examined.
But the relevance of religious freedom for First Amendment interpretation is not restricted to that kind of situation. Not merely what an
individual can claim as a constitutional right, but the full political
freedom which he has to exercise his religious beliefs, as well, should
play a part in the meaning given to establishment.
This kind of consideration is not new to the Court. Justice Black in
Everson saw quite clearly that genuine interests of religious freedom
were represented by those parents in New Jersey who wanted to share
Id. at 299. Italics in original.
215. The classic expression of this theme is Katz, Freedom of Religion and
State Neutrality, 20 U. OF CHI. I. REV. 426 (1953).
214.
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in the school bus program and still send their children to Catholic
schools, even though no free exercise claim was before the Court.
Similarly, the Court has apparently taken into account the legitimacy
of a legislature's concern for religious freedom of Sabbatarians, since
it has refused to hold that an exemption from Sunday closing laws
constitutes establishment. 2 16 And it will be recalled that the Court
has specifically ruled that the constitutional free exercise of religion
is not infringed by the refusal to provide such an exemption. 2 1" Despite the number of instances in which the Court has displayed an
appreciation of the consequences for freedom of a holding against
governmental involvement with religion, an unarticulated premise
continues to assert itself that all involvements are per se bad. The
pervasive attitude of many judicial opinions is that only the most
pressing circumstances of privation to religion will justify an accommodation of religion by the state.
A good example of this attitude may have been provided by Justice
Brennan in his analysis of the respective interests served by the First
Amendment as applied to public schools. In his view, free exercise
permits the parent to choose to send his child to a private school for
religious training, and the establishment clause protects against any
attempts to introduce religion into the public school. 2 18 Justice
Stewart challenges the validity of this approach when he asks, in
effect, why the exercise of religious freedom should be denied individuals within the framework of a public institution. In other words,
why cannot each of the participants in the Bible-reading programs
expect the Crurt to give serious attention to their claims of freedom
to say a prayer? The claim is not that the denial of the opportunity
to read the Bible in school is a violation of free exercise; rather the
position simply argues that any citizen is entitled to maximum freedom of religion consistent with everyone else's freedom, and therefore
the right to effectuate such programs as that involved in Schempp
and Murray ought not to be constitutionally barred. 2 1 9 When Justice
Brennan concludes that the public schools cannot be the occasion for
such a manifestation of religion, he may rely upon the establishment
clause under any one of the shadowy rationales which the Court has
developed. Or perhaps his conclusion is instinctive, and judgment
outstrips analysis. But it ought to be recognized that in spinning out
216. Commonwealth v. Arlan's Dept. Store, Inc., 371 US 218 (1962)
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question).
217. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).

(appeal

218. See text at note 178, supra.
219. For an analysis and rejection of the argument that the exclusion of
prayers -from public schools represents a violation of the free exercise clause,

see Pollack, supra note 177. See infra note 220.
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elaborate theories based on historical analogues and tendentious fears,
the Court is also disposing of an important interest of present users
of these public institutions.
One may contend that the establishment clause is basic, and anything which parades under the concept of religious freedom must first
show that it does not disturb the exegesis of the first 10 words of the
Amendment. But surely the establishment clause is not so self-defining or readily reducible to unchallengable meaning that the Court can
ignore or treat cursorily the evidence of present denial of religious
freedom. This is not to contend that these claims should necessarily
prevail, but only to express doubt that the standards for detecting
unconstitutional involvements are so obvious that no judicial balancing of individual claims to religious freedom is needed.
Once it is recognized that judicial determinations of establishment
have significance for the opportunities of individuals to take advantage of their religious freedom, as well as in the provision of bulwarks
against religious authoritarianism by the state, the role being discharged by the Justices can be better appreciated. For if the Court
prohibits involvements of state and religion on the ground that indirect preferences are de facto involved, such as the variation in sects'
willingness and ability to participate in a released time program, at
one and the same time a public facility is removed from use by one
group of individuals and made more acceptable to the religious groups
who cannot or will not use that facility. The point is not that the
schools therefore become institutions which by their structure violate
the free exercise of religion of those who want to have these instruction classes on premises. Neither is the proposition maintained that
the official exclusion of such practices itself creates an established
religion. But the urgency of explaining why such a result is constitutionally demanded is increased by the understanding that the decision
amounts to a judicial preference for the religious freedom of those
who want the instructions excluded from the premises, as against
those who think it desirable to offer such classes. In serving one
man's freedom the Court is disserving another's. 22 0
220. The conclusion that the prohibition of prayers from public schools
does not violate the First Amendment leaves untouched the question whether as,
a matter of religious freedom in the broad sense, the secularization of these
schools by constitutional interpretation does not de facto favor groups with
particular views about religious training. In that sense the allegation that a
religion of secularism is being "established" cannot be lightly dismissed. Similarly,
if one argues that the intrusion of voluntary religious programs in the schools
produces indirect coercive effect upon those students who do not wish to participate, the exclusive of these programs by judicial decision has a similar effect on
those children who do wish to participate (i.e., through state action they are
directed (coerced?) to abandon such practices in the schools). See note 156 supra.
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A sharper awareness by the Court that religious freedom is sometimes represented by those favoring state involvements as well as
those opposing them would lead to a more liberal approach to churchstate problems. This does not imply that every claim of religious
freedom must be, or could be, recognized. The conceptual framework
for decision might be loosened, however, to permit a more comprehensive evaluation of all the factors present in a given case. Rather
than starting with an assumption that a construct called establishment is objectively discoverable and represents an inflexible basepoint for judicial reasoning, the assumption would instead read that
the primary thrust of the First Amendment is to provide the maximum opportunity for religious manifestation. This approach would
ask at what point the expression of religious freedom by those who
take advantage of secular facilities or agencies exceeds what the rest
of society can safely endure, for fear of their own religious freedom.
Establishment would thus become the limit of religious freedom permissible in the state, as free exercise is now the limit of state interference with a particular individual's freedom.
This will sound like unmitigated heresy for those who have adopted
the separationist prejudice. But such an approach does not require
any radical departure from the pattern of conclusions which has
emerged in church-state decisions. The Everson dicta would still
apply across the board. Certainly the state could not set up a church
or contribute money directly to a church for its support. There never
has been any dispute that the Amendment prohibits the historic type
of establishments. Furthermore, the standard of aid or preference to
religion generally, as opposed to favoritism of a particular sect, would
still constitute establishment. The specific danger in such preferences
is the power which the state would hold to shape and affect, directly
or indirectly, the free religious choices of its citizens.
But the sensitivity to all aspects of religious freedom which this
approach calls for might, well have an effect upon what would be considered aid or preference. The deliberate accommodation by the state
of all religious views in a particular secular program would not in
itself be considered aid.
A comparison of the McCollum, Engel and Schempp cases may serve
to illustrate the significance which such an approach would have. In
all three of these involvements, a public institution was the scene of
a particular type of exercise of religious freedom. One element of the
determination of whether these programs are establishments is the
claim made by their sponsors that a given number of citizens desire
that their children have a chance to participate. The cost of the use
of the public property is infinitesimal, and the officials in charge of
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the buildings have discretion to determine whether employment of
the facility by outsiders should be conditioned on payment for wear
and tear. 2 21

One great difference in the three arrangements is that teachers
participate in and administer the religious manifestation in the
prayer cases. Furthermore, the state officials are engaged in the writing of the prayer or the selection of the books to be read (i.e., the
Bible). While both Engel and Schempp relate to worship, and McCollum to religious instruction, the critical difference between them is
that for the released time program the state need only provide the
opportunity for religious pluralism to manifest itself, while in the
prayer cases the state agencies themselves present the religious element. As noted earlier, there is solid ground upon which to argue
that the state should not compose a prayer or choose a religious
selection, thus implying governmental approval of their spiritual
validity. But that is quite different from permitting private individuals and organizations to say prayers or receive religious instructions
on public property.
In Engel and Schempp, the state was not merely reflecting religious
diversity; it was writing prayers and specifying religious reading.
But suppose that the rule of the Board of Education merely granted
groups of students the right to meet at certain times by themselves or
under parental supervision to say a prayer, or read the Bible. Why
should the state decision to permit or deny such a program be a matter
of constitutional decision? Of all the establishment decisions, probably only the Mcollum result would be changed by an application of
the principle of religious freedom as a guide to the meaning of establishment.
221. As Justice Brennan has remarked, this kind of "actual incremental
cost" are "negligible." School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 262 (1963) (concurring opinion). Compare the views expressed in note 170, supra.

